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SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS LIMITS ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES
AWARDS: “MORALS WITHOUT TECHNIQUE”?
F. Patrick Hubbard*
In a series of cases decided over the last two decades, the Supreme
Court has used the Due Process Clause to establish a procedural and
substantive framework for awarding punitive damages. Initially, the
substantive aspects of this framework were sufficiently clear and flexible
that they required little change in the system and probably generated a
helpful level of debate and uniformity as to some basic requirements for
awards. However, in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the Court
adopted an approach characterized by a lack of clarity and consistency, an
inadequate basis in theory and policy, and ad hoc decisions. The harmful
results of this approach are evident in the Court’s recent decision, Philip
Morris USA v. Williams, which requires states to instruct juries in terms
of a distinction that the four dissenting judges refer to as elusive, unclear,
and confusing. Even if one accepts the view that there should be, at some
point, substantive due process limits on the amount of punitive damages,
decisions like Williams are likely to make the process less fair and reliable.
Therefore, the Court should abandon its current approach, which is both
unnecessary and likely to do more harm than good, and should, instead, be
more deferential to the state courts and legislatures, and be more
concerned with developing a coherent framework.

* Ronald L. Motley Distinguished Professor of Tort Law, University of South Carolina
School of Law. The author appreciates the helpful comments of Robert L. Felix, Dennis Nolan, and
David G. Owen on a draft of this Article.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In a series of cases over the last two decades, the Supreme Court has
used the Due Process Clause to establish a procedural and substantive
framework for awarding punitive damages. Initially, the substantive
aspects of this framework were sufficiently flexible and clear that they
required little change in the system and probably generated a helpful level
of debate and uniformity as to some basic requirements for awards.
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However, starting with BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,1 the Court
began an effort to micromanage the process of awarding punitive damages
by imposing on the state courts its own substantive framework for
determining the amount of punitive damages. This framework has made
the process less fair and reliable because the Court’s decisions have shown
a lack of clarity and consistency, an inadequate basis in terms of theory
and policy, and an ad hoc approach to the application and construction of
the framework.
The Court’s recent decision, Philip Morris USA v. Williams,2 illustrates
these problems. The case requires states to instruct juries in terms of the
following distinction: Juries may consider harm to third parties in
determining the amount of punitive damages (because such harm is
relevant to the degree of reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct), but
juries may not increase punitive damages awards to punish “directly” the
defendant for this harm.3 The four dissenting Justices refer to this
distinction as elusive and unclear.4 Their concern can be summarized by
the following question, which the majority never addresses: If an
additional amount of punishment is imposed because harm to a third party
from similar conduct makes the conduct that harmed the plaintiff more
reprehensible, then what is the nature and purpose of this additional
amount if it is not punishment for the third-party harm?5 The Williams case
requires states either to do something that is virtually impossible—i.e.,
craft an instruction that enables lay persons to follow a distinction that is
unclear to four Supreme Court Justices—or to give jury instructions that
are, at best, empty formalistic incantations about a meaningless and
potentially confusing distinction. Thus Williams most clearly indicates that
the Court’s ad hoc attempts to develop a “moral” framework to prevent
“grossly excessive” awards of punitive damages may fall within Karl
Llewellyn’s statement that “morals without technique is a mess.”6
To place Williams in context, Part II of this Article summarizes the
procedural and substantive aspects of the Supreme Court’s constitutional
scheme. Part III critiques the substantive standard of “grossly excessive”
1. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
2. 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).
3. Id. at 1065. For further discussion of Williams, see infra notes 36–43, 53, 58, 61 and
accompanying text.
4. Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“This nuance eludes me.”); id. at
1069 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting) (indicating that the charge
sought by the defendants at trial that allegedly makes the distinction was useless and more likely
to confuse than enlighten the jury).
5. See id. at 1068 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting).
6. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY
STATE xi (1990) (quoting Karl Llewellyn as saying: “Technique without morals is a menace; but
morals without technique is a mess.”).
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punitive awards in terms of four concerns: precedent, clarity and
consistency, novelty and utility, and theoretical basis. This discussion does
not offer a “solution” to the problems raised by these concerns. Instead, it
analyzes each concern in terms of its importance and, in some cases,
intractability. Because of possible arguments that constitutional standards,
even if vague, are needed, Part IV discusses the Court’s reason for
imposing a necessarily vague standard in this area. This Article concludes
in Part V by arguing that, because continuing the current approach to
identifying grossly excessive awards is both unnecessary and likely to do
more harm than good, the Court should be more deferential to state courts
and legislatures, and more concerned with developing a coherent
framework.
II. THE SUPREME COURT ’S FRAMEWORK FOR PUNITIVE
DAMAGES AWARDS
A. Development of Framework
The Court began developing its punitive damages framework in
Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,7
which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibition of excessive fines did
not apply to punitive awards “when the government neither has prosecuted
the action nor has any right to receive a share of the damages awarded.”8
Browning-Ferris did not address excessiveness under the Due Process
Clause because petitioners failed to raise the issue in the lower courts or
to mention it in their petition for certiorari.9 The Court addressed the due
process issue two years later in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Haslip,10 which held that the Due Process Clause applied to punitive
damages awards.11 The Court also held that Alabama’s scheme for
imposing punitive damages in this insurance fraud case was constitutional
and that the punitive award involved did “not cross the line into the area
7. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
8. Id. at 263–64. A later case applied the Excessive Fines Clause to a civil forfeiture. United
States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998). The result in Browning-Ferris may be different in
many states today because of the adoption of statutory schemes granting the state a share in
punitive awards. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 616–18 (1996) (Ginsberg,
J., dissenting) (listing states with a scheme that allocates a share of punitive damages to the state);
F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV.
437, 505, 509 (2006) (discussing statutes that allow the state to share in the award). The Ohio
Supreme Court, acting on its inherent common-law powers, adopted a sharing arrangement without
a statute. Hubbard, supra, at 509.
9. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 276–77.
10. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
11. Id. at 17–18.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol60/iss2/2

4

Waldman and Hubbard: In Honor of Walter O. Weyrauch: Substantive Due Process Limits on

2008]

SU BSTAN TIVE D U E PRO C ESS LIM ITS O N PU N ITIVE D AM AG ES AW ARD S

353

of constitutional impropriety.”12 The Alabama scheme involved
(1) instructions and evidentiary rules to structure and limit jury discretion
in determining punitive damages and (2) a detailed list of relevant factors
for judges to use when reviewing a jury’s determination.13 Similarly, TXO
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,14 decided two years after
Haslip, held that the Due Process Clause barred “grossly excessive”
punitive awards and that a $10 million punitive award in a slander-of-title
case involving $19,000 in compensatory damages was not grossly
excessive.15 The next year, Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg16 relied on the Due
Process Clause to impose the procedural requirement of judicial review of
the jury’s punitive damages award.17 Based on this holding, the Court
reversed and remanded a case where the amount of the award had not been
subjected to judicial review.18
Gore, which was decided in 1996, is the first case to use substantive
due process to strike down the amount of an award.19 In Gore, an Alabama
jury awarded $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive
damages against BMW for fraudulently selling a car with minor repairs as
“new.”20 The Alabama Supreme Court remitted this verdict to $2 million.21
As an initial point, Gore noted that a state may not punish a defendant for
out-of-state conduct that was lawful where committed and that had no
impact on the state.22 However, this restriction was not at issue in Gore
because the Alabama Supreme Court “eschewed reliance on BMW’s outof-state conduct” in granting the remitted $2 million award.23 Therefore,
the U.S. Supreme Court addressed whether the punitive award was grossly
excessive.24 The Court set forth three factors for determining this issue:
(1) the degree of reprehensibility, which is “[p]erhaps the most important
12. Id. at 23–24. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of Haslip of $1,040,000, which
combined compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 7 n.2. The Supreme Court “accepted” a
description of the verdict as containing “a punitive damages amount of not less than $840,000.” Id.
13. See id. at 19–23. For further discussion of the Alabama scheme, see infra notes 155–59
and accompanying text.
14. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
15. Id. at 462.
16. 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
17. Id. at 418.
18. Id. at 419, 435.
19. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585–86 (1996). As noted in TXO
Production Corp., several early twentieth-century cases recognized that the Due Process Clause
imposed limits on the amount of punitive civil awards but held that the amounts involved were
permissible. 509 U.S. at 454–55.
20. Gore, 517 U.S. at 563–65.
21. Id. at 567.
22. Id. at 572–73.
23. Id. at 573–74.
24. Id. at 574.
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indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award,” (2) the ratio
of the punitive award to the actual and potential harm from the defendant’s
wrongdoing, and (3) the criminal and regulatory sanctions for comparable
misconduct.25 Based on this three-part test, the Court held the award
grossly excessive, reversed the judgment, and remanded the case.26
Five years after Gore, the Court returned to procedural due process in
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.27 In Cooper
Industries the Court concluded that appellate courts must apply de novo
review when determining whether a punitive damages award is “grossly
excessive.”28 The Court stressed that the Seventh Amendment prevents an
appellate court from applying the de novo standard to findings of fact by
the jury.29 The Court also noted that a state appellate court could use a
different standard of review in conducting a common-law review of
punitive damages.30 Although the Court remanded the case to the Ninth
Circuit for de novo review, the Court’s opinion analyzed, based on Gore’s
three-factor test, the $4.5 million punitive damages award (with a $50,000
compensatory damages award) for false advertising and unfair
competition.31 This analysis was designed to “illustrate why . . . the Court
of Appeals’ answer to . . . [the constitutional] question may depend upon
the standard of review.”32

25. Id. at 574–75.
26. Id. at 585–86. On remand, the Alabama Supreme Court held that a new trial was required
unless the plaintiff accepted a remitted award of $50,000. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 701 So.
2d 507, 515 (Ala. 1997).
27. 532 U.S. 424 (2001). Because this case reviewed an award imposed in a federal district
court and was discussed within the context of the Seventh Amendment, the case could arguably be
viewed as based on the Supreme Court’s supervisory powers over federal courts rather than on the
Due Process Clause. See Cynthia L. Blackwell, Note, Did Cooper v. Leatherman Require State
Appellate Courts to Apply a De Novo Standard of Review for Determining the Constitutional
Excessiveness of Punitive Damages Claims? Aken v. Plains Electric Generation & Transmission
Cooperative, Inc., 34 N.M. L. REV. 405, 416 (2004). However, language in Cooper suggests that
state courts are bound, see Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 440 n.13, and state supreme courts have
generally treated de novo review as a constitutional requirement, see, e.g., Simon v. San Paolo U.S.
Holding Co., 113 P.3d 63, 70 (Cal. 2005) (using de novo review to decide if an award was
excessive); Mosing v. Domas, 830 So. 2d 967, 973 (La. 2002) (listing cases and applying de novo
review to due process review but not common-law review); Aken v. Plains Elec. Generation &
Transmission Coop., Inc., 49 P.3d 662, 668 (N.M. 2002) (“Cooper Industries imposed de novo
review as a matter of federal constitutional imperative.”).
28. Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 436.
29. Id. at 433, 440 n.13.
30. Id. at 440 n.14.
31. Id. at 441–43.
32. Id. at 443. On remand, the Ninth Circuit applied the three Gore factors in a de novo
review and reduced the punitive award to $500,000. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus.,
Inc., 285 F.3d 1146, 1147 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Two years later, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell33 used the Gore framework to reverse a $145 million punitive
damages award in an insurer’s bad-faith “failure to settle” case involving
a compensatory award of $1 million.34 In terms of reprehensibility, the
Court reiterated that an award could not be based on lawful out-of-state
conduct with no “nexus to the specific harm suffered by the plaintiff” and
stated that “[a] defendant’s dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon
which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive
damages.”35
Williams, the most recent case, addresses the question of how to charge
the jury regarding wrongdoing and harms similar to those involving the
plaintiff that affect third parties residing in the same state as the plaintiff.36
The jury found that Philip Morris had fraudulently misrepresented the risks
of smoking its cigarettes and awarded compensatory damages of
approximately $821,000 (of which $800,000 was noneconomic) and $79.5
million in punitive damages.37 The Oregon Supreme Court upheld the
award.38 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the punitive damages award
because the jury instructions failed to clarify that similar wrongdoing and
harm to third parties in Oregon must be addressed in terms of the
following distinction: A jury may properly consider similar harm to third
parties in determining the amount of a punitive award insofar as that harm
is relevant to the degree of reprehensibility of defendant’s conduct, but “a
jury may not go further than this and use a punitive damages verdict to
punish a defendant directly on account of harms it is alleged to have
visited on nonparties.”39 The Court remanded the case to the Oregon
Supreme Court.40 Because this remand might result in a new trial or in a
reduction in the amount of punitive damages, the Supreme Court did not
consider whether the award amount was grossly excessive.41 Though the
Court indicated that it would “only consider the Constitution’s procedural
33. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
34. Id. at 412, 429.
35. Id. at 422–23.
36. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1061–65 (2007).
37. Id. at 1060–61.
38. Williams v. Phillip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1182 (Or. 2006), vacated, 127 S. Ct. 1057
(2007). The trial judge held that the punitive damages award of $79.5 million was excessive and
reduced it to $32 million. Id. at 1171. On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals reinstated the $79.5
million award. The Oregon Supreme Court denied review. On appeal, the Supreme Court
remanded the matter for reconsideration in light of Campbell. On remand, the Oregon Court of
Appeals did not change its view, and the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the $79.5 million punitive
damages award. Id. at 1171, 1182. This decision was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court. See
Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1062.
39. Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1064.
40. Id. at 1065.
41. Id.
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limitations,”42 the holding in Williams clearly addresses the substantive
content of the jury instructions.43
B. Summary of Framework
The procedural dimension of the Supreme Court’s due process
framework for imposing punitive damages has three components. First,
though it is desirable to use a standard of proof like “clear and convincing
evidence,” the Constitution permits a state to use a lower standard like
“preponderance of the evidence.”44 Second, a state must provide de novo
appellate review of the constitutionality of the amount of a punitive
damages award.45 Third, a state must give fair notice of both the conduct
subject to punitive damages and the severity of the penalty to be
imposed.46
In practice, the content of the required notice intertwines with the
substantive issues of the conduct that would justify punitive damages and
of the standard for determining the amount of the award. The TXO
Production Corp. Court rejected the defendant’s claim that the standard
for conduct was unconstitutionally vague by reasoning as follows: “[T]he
notice component of the Due Process Clause is satisfied if prior law fairly
indicated that a punitive damages award might be imposed in response to
egregiously tortious conduct. Prior law, in West Virginia and elsewhere,
unquestionably did so.”47 The substantive dimension of the adequacy of
notice of the amount of a possible award is measured by the three factors
set forth in Gore—i.e., defendants have notice that they are subject to a
punitive damages award in accordance with these factors.
Gore’s three-part test has been supplemented by specific, substantive
guidance on the facts that courts should consider in applying the test and
by requirements concerning the instructions to the jury, like the distinction
imposed by Williams, concerning the jury’s consideration of the factors.48
The following list from Campbell provides examples of factors relevant
to reprehensibility:
42. Id. at 1063.
43. See, e.g., id. at 1067 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“It matters not that the Court styles today’s
holding as ‘procedural’ because the ‘procedural’ rule is simply a confusing implementation of the
substantive due process regime this Court has created for punitive damages.”).
44. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 n.11 (1991). Courts commonly use the
“clear and convincing standard.” See Hubbard, supra note 8, at 501.
45. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
46. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) (severity of penalty); TXO Prod.
Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 465–66 (1993) (conduct).
47. TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 465–66 (citation omitted).
48. See supra notes 2–6, 39 and accompanying text; infra notes 52, 57 and accompanying
text. For other examples of a required charge to the jury, see infra notes 155, 162 and
accompanying text.
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We have instructed courts to determine the reprehensibility of
a defendant by considering whether: the harm caused was
physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct
evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health
or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial
vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an
isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional
malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.49
It is tempting to conclude that the Court has also provided substantive
guidance on factors that may not be considered in applying Gore’s factors.
In particular, one such impermissible factor might be out-of-state conduct
that is lawful in the state where it is committed. This concern was present
in both Gore and Campbell, and is perhaps based as least as much, if not
more, on federalism and interstate commerce than on due process.50
However, as indicated below in Part III, the treatment of out-of-state
conduct is complicated because there may be instances where even lawful
out-of-state conduct would be relevant to reprehensibility.51
C. The Dissenting Opinions
Several Justices do not support the substantive framework. Justices
Scalia and Thomas have consistently dissented from the opinions
establishing the substantive framework, arguing that the Constitution
provides no substantive limit on the size of punitive damages awards and
that the framework cannot be applied in a principled fashion.52 In addition,
in Williams they joined Justice Ginsberg’s dissent, which argued that the
Oregon Supreme Court correctly applied Gore, that the defendants failed
to preserve error, and that the distinction relied upon by the majority
would confuse a jury if included in the jury charge.53
49. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003). For further
discussion of factors relevant to reprehensibility, see infra notes 81–111 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Campbell, 538 U.S. at 422 (“A basic principle of federalism is that each State
may make its own reasoned judgment about what conduct is permitted or proscribed within its
borders, and each State alone can determine what measure of punishment, if any, to impose on a
defendant who acts within its jurisdiction.”); Gore, 517 U.S. at 572, 585 (referring to “principles
of state sovereignty and comity” and to the “federal interest in preventing individual states from
imposing undue burdens on interstate commerce”); infra notes 224–26.
51. See infra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.
52. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1067–68 (2007) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 429 (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Gore, 517 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting). Justices Scalia and Thomas
have not dissented from the procedural parts of the Court’s framework. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 443 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 443
(Scalia, J., concurring); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 416 (1994) (majority opinion,
joined by Thomas, J.); id. at 435 (Scalia, J., concurring).
53. See Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1068–69 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); supra notes 2–6 and
accompanying text.
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Justice Ginsburg has disagreed with both the substantive and the
procedural parts of the framework.54 In Oberg, she dissented from
imposing judicial review primarily because she thought that Oregon
provided adequate procedural limitations on the jury’s discretion.
Specifically, she found that Oregon’s trial process was adequate because
it (1) limited the recovery of punitive damages to the amount requested in
the complaint, (2) prohibited evidence of a defendant’s wealth until the
plaintiff showed a prima facie case of a right to recover punitive damages,
(3) required that “wanton disregard for the health, safety, and welfare of
others” be shown by “clear and convincing evidence,” and (4) required a
jury charge including a statutory list of factors relevant to the amount of
the award.55
Justice Ginsburg dissented in Cooper Industries for two reasons. First,
the Seventh Amendment barred de novo review of the amount of the
award, which she viewed as basically a factual finding.56 Second, it was
impractical to expect lower courts to apply two very subtle distinctions: (1)
between the amount of the award, which is subject to de novo review, and
the “specific findings of fact” relevant to the amount of damages, and (2)
“between ordinary common-law excessiveness [reviewed on the basis of
an abuse of discretion standard] and constitutional excessiveness
[reviewed de novo].”57
Though Justice Ginsburg’s dissents from the substantive framework
have been based partly on her view of the records below and on the flaws
in requirements like the distinction concerning third-party harms in
Williams,58 they have focused on two interrelated concerns: (1) the lack of
an objective test for gross excessiveness, and (2) the institutional limits on
the ability of the Supreme Court, unaided by lower federal courts, to
superintend the level of state court punitive damages awards without an
objective test.59
Justice Stevens, who authored the Court’s opinions in four of the seven
due process cases,60 dissented in Williams. He disagreed with the
54. See Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1068 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Campbell, 538 U.S. at 430
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 444 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Gore, 517 U.S.
at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Oberg, 512 U.S. at 436 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
55. Oberg, 512 U.S. at 438–43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
56. Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 444–49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 450. The majority in Cooper Industries explicitly noted that an abuse-of-discretion
standard would continue to apply to underlying facts and to reasonableness based on state law
standards. Id. at 433, 439 n.12 (majority opinion).
58. See Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1068–69 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Campbell, 538 U.S. at
431–39 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Gore, 517 U.S. at 607–11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). For further
discussion of the distinction in Williams, see supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text.
59. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 431 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Gore, 517 U.S. at 611–14
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
60. These cases are Cooper Industries, Gore, Oberg, and TXO Production Corp. (plurality
opinion). Justice Stevens also joined Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Browning-Ferris Industries of
Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part
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majority’s reliance on the “distinction between taking third-party harm
into account in order to assess the reprehensibility of the defendant’s
conduct—which is permitted—from doing so in order to punish the
defendant ‘directly’—which is forbidden” because he had concluded,
“This nuance eludes me.”61
III. CRITIQUE OF SUBSTANTIVE FRAMEWORK
A. Precedent
The Court has argued that its imposition of the substantive framework
is supported by a series of early twentieth-century (“Lochner-era”) cases
recognizing that, at some point, there must be a substantive limit on the
size of punitive damages awards.62 However, these cases appear to treat the
money awards involved as penal in the sense of a state regulatory scheme,
not in terms of a civil punitive damages award.63 Moreover, the Court
concedes that none of the Lochner-era cases held that the limit had been
exceeded.64 Thus, at best, these cases provide authority only for the
principle that some limit must be imposed. The development of the
substantive framework for identifying that limit has been solely a matter of
creative decision-making by the Court in Gore, Campbell, and Williams.
The Court also claims support from more modern cases. Some of
these65 clearly do not apply.66 The Court has also referred to cases applying
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment in
the criminal-law system.67 Though not based on the Due Process Clause,
these cases provide partial support for some specific aspects of the
substantive framework. However, the Court can use this support in
determining details only after making the decision to use the Due Process
Clause to impose that framework. Moreover, the Court has used an ad hoc
approach to decide when and how to follow the criminal-punishment cases
in developing its substantive framework.68
This lack of precedent is, to a considerable extent, beside the point.
Constitutional jurisprudence has always been characterized by the
and dissenting in part).
61. Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1066–67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453–54 (1993); see BrowningFerris, 492 U.S. at 276; id. at 280–81 (Brennan, J., concurring).
63. See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Due Process and Punitive Damages: The Error of
Federal Excessiveness Jurisprudence, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1085, 1116–18 (2006) (noting that the
Court has determined “that punitive damages are not sufficiently penal or fine-like to fall within
the protection of the Eighth Amendment”).
64. TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 453–54.
65. See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 12 (1991).
66. See Spencer, supra note 63, at 1111–16.
67. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc., v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576 n.24 (1996) (noting that
punishments should not be excessive).
68. See infra notes 140–42, 171–201 and accompanying text.
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occasional adoption of new, and thus unprecedented, principles. Moreover,
there is merit in the principle that, at some point, a limit on the amount of
punitive damages must be imposed. For example, a punitive damages
award of $2 billion in Gore would seem so outrageously excessive by
almost any measure that it should, somehow, be declared unconstitutional.
In any event, as a practical matter, the Court is not likely to abandon the
principle in the near future because the Court explicitly recognized the
principle of a substantive due process limit nearly twenty years ago and a
solid six-justice majority currently supports the substantive due process
scheme.69 For these reasons, this Article does not address whether there
should be a substantive limit on the amount of punitive damages. Instead,
the Article focuses on the Court’s design and application of the framework
for imposing the limit.
B. Clarity and Consistency
1. The Need for a Clear Framework
The Supreme Court candidly admitted that its substantive framework
cannot avoid some degree of vagueness:
We need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical
bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the
constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case. We
can say, however, that general concerns of reasonableness
and adequate guidance from the court when the case is tried
to a jury properly enter into the constitutional calculus.70
No “bright line” test is possible because punitive damages “awards are the
product of numerous, and sometimes intangible, factors; a jury imposing
a punitive damages award must make a qualitative assessment based on a
host of facts and circumstances unique to the particular case before
it. . . . [N]o two cases are truly identical . . . .”71 The Court has adopted the
view that the necessary vagueness in its framework will be reduced over
time because the Gore factors will acquire “more meaningful content
through case-by-case application at the appellate level.”72

69. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion in Williams was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
by Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Alito. Justice Stevens dissented in Williams, but only on the
matter of the details of the framework. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1065–66
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens has consistently supported imposing a substantive due
process framework and authored the majority or plurality opinions in Cooper Industries, Gore,
Oberg, and TXO Production Corp.
70. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.
71. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 457 (1993).
72. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001).
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However, for this appellate development to be effective, the Court’s
framework must provide lower appellate courts with clear guidance for
addressing the size of punitive damages awards. Lower courts need such
guidance because, as Justice Ginsburg has noted in dissent, the Supreme
Court cannot be the final appellate forum for even a small portion of the
punitive damages cases decided in the United States.73 The limits on the
Court are reflected in the small percentage of cases where certiorari is
granted74 and by the fact that, starting with Browning-Ferris in 1989 and
concluding with Williams in 2007, the Court has decided only eight
punitive damages cases in eighteen years.75 This necessarily limited rate
of review is important because the number of punitive damages awards to
be reviewed in any year is so high. Punitive damages awards are
uncommon, but the sheer number of tort cases decided each year means
there will be a substantial number of punitive damages awards.76 For
example, a study of the seventy-five largest counties in the United States
indicated that there were about 7,948 tort trials in 2001, that plaintiffs won
about 52% of the trials, and that less than 5% of winning plaintiffs
received punitive damages.77 In 217 cases involving punitive damages, 45
awarded damages of over $250,000 and 23 over $1 million.78
The majority opinion in Gore responded in a footnote to Justice
Ginsburg’s concern about the limits on the Court’s ability to superintend
the amount of state court punitive damages awards as follows:
The small number of punitive damages questions that we
have reviewed in recent years, together with the fact that this
is the first case in decades in which we have found that a
73. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 536 (1992) (“Last Term alone we
received over 5,000 petitions for certiorari, but we have the capacity to decide only a small fraction
of these cases on the merits.”). The Court’s case load has declined in recent years. See, e.g., David
Von Drehle, Inside the Incredibly Shrinking Role of the Supreme Court. And Why John Roberts Is
O.K. with That, TIME , Oct. 22, 2007, at 40, 44 (“[T]he court is tackling fewer cases than at any
other time in the past half-century. Last term’s output of just 68 decisions was the lowest since
1953.”).
75. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. 424; BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994); TXO Prod. Corp.,
509 U.S. 443; Haslip, 499 U.S. 1; Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 494
U.S. 257 (1989).
76. See, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 8, at 443–44, 503–04 (discussing studies indicating that
750,000 tort suits were filed in 2000, that about 3% of filed cases are tried, and that punitive
damages awards are uncommon).
77. THOMAS J. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS,
2001: TORT TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001, at 1, 5, 7 (2004), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/ttvlc01.htm.
78. Id. at 5.
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punitive damages award exceeds the constitutional limit,
indicates that this concern is at best premature. In any event,
this consideration surely does not justify an abdication of our
responsibility to enforce constitutional protections in an
extraordinary case such as this one.79
This response has several flaws. First, the “small number” of cases
reviewed and the fact that the award in Gore may be the Court’s “first
case” finding an award excessive are more likely due to the vagaries of
getting a case to the Court than to the number of cases that require review.
Second, the view that such cases are unusual contradicts the Court’s
argument that the substantive due process framework is necessary to
address the “concern about punitive damages that ‘run wild.’”80 Finally,
“enforc[ing] constitutional protections” in a single case does not address
the Court’s inability to control the system of imposing punitive damages.
Relatively rare fact-specific determinations that a particular award has (or
has not) complied with substantive due process provide little systematic
guidance. Only a clear, consistent framework can provide systematic
protection of any constitutional right involved.
2. Vague and Contradictory Nature of Framework
a. Reprehensibility
Gore contains some extraordinarily contradictory positions.81 For
example, on the one hand, the case establishes a three-factor test and
stresses that degree of reprehensibility is the most important factor,82 while
on the other hand, three of the five Justices in the majority join in a
concurring opinion asserting that the degree of reprehensibility “provides
little guidance on how to relate culpability to the size of an award.”83
Perhaps recognizing this lack of guidance, the Court has attempted to
reduce vagueness by identifying the following factors as relevant to
reprehensibility: (1) whether the harm was physical, economic, or

79. Gore, 517 U.S. at 586 n.41.
80. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18; see, e.g., id. at 61 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Recent
years . . . have witnessed an explosion in the frequency and size of punitive damages awards.”);
Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 282 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting
a “trend to award multimillion dollar awards of punitive damages”). For further discussion of the
Court’s view that there is a need to address problems with the system used by lower courts in
awarding punitive damages, see infra Part IV.
81. For other examples, see infra notes 112–21, 249–50 and accompanying text.
82. Gore, 517 U.S. at 575.
83. Id. at 590 (Breyer, J., joined by O’Connor, J., and Souter, J., concurring).
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emotional in nature and whether it is permanent or temporary,84 (2)
whether the defendant’s “mental state” evinces intentional, knowing,
reckless, or accidental conduct,85 (3) whether the victim was vulnerable,86
and (4) whether the defendant attempted to conceal the wrongdoing.87
Evidence with a sufficient “nexus” to one of these factors is relevant even
if it involves misconduct involving a third party or lawful out-of-state
conduct.88 In this regard, out-of-state conduct is treated like the in-state
conduct involved in Williams because a state cannot punish out-of-state
conduct, but some out-of-state conduct may be considered in applying the
Gore factors. For example, Campbell stated:
Lawful out-of-state conduct may be probative when it
demonstrates the deliberateness and culpability of the
defendant’s action in the State where it is tortious, but that
conduct must have a nexus to the specific harm suffered by
the plaintiff. A jury must be instructed, furthermore, that it
may not use evidence of out-of-state conduct to punish a
defendant for action that was lawful in the jurisdiction where
it occurred.89
84. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003); Gore, 517 U.S.
at 575 n.24, 576. The Court has not treated mental distress consistently. Gore noted that conduct
is more reprehensible if the victim suffers “‘mental fear, torture, and agony of mind.’” Gore, 517
U.S. at 575 n.24 (quoting Blanchard v. Morris, 15 Ill. 35, 36 (Ill. 1853)). In contrast, Campbell
devalued mental distress in terms of the ratio factor, arguing as follows:
The compensatory damages for the injury suffered here, moreover, likely were
based on a component which was duplicated in the punitive award. Much of the
distress was caused by the outrage and humiliation the Campbells suffered at the
actions of their insurer; and it is a major role of punitive damages to condemn
such conduct. Compensatory damages, however, already contain this punitive
element.
538 U.S. at 426. For further discussion of the treatment of mental distress in Gore and Campbell,
see infra notes 126–33 and accompanying text.
85. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419; Gore, 517 U.S. at 575–76, 576 n.26.
86. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419.
87. Gore noted that the defendant had not concealed “ evidence of improper motive,” such
as the defendants had in Haslip and TXO. Gore, 517 U.S. at 579; see Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21 (1991) (approving the existence of concealment as a factor in determining
awards in Alabama).
88. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 422; Gore, 517 U.S. at 572–73, 574 n.21; Steven R. Hamlin,
Punitive Damages After Campbell, 28 CAMPBELL L. REV. 63, 101 (2005).
89. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 422. Gore noted:
Alabama does not have the power, however, to punish BMW for conduct that was
lawful where it occurred and that had no impact on Alabama or its residents. Nor
may Alabama impose sanctions on BMW in order to deter conduct that is lawful
in other jurisdictions.
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Thus, where the requisite nexus exists, both in-state and out-of-state thirdparty conduct raise the problems with applying the distinction between
considering such conduct in assessing reprehensibility but not using it to
punish the defendant directly.90
The utility of the Court’s list of factors relevant to reprehensibility is
limited because the factors are vague, they can conflict with one another,
and the presence or absence of one or all the factors is not determinative.91
Moreover, there may be other factors that the Court has not yet explicitly
identified as relevant. For example, Haslip approved the Alabama scheme,
which involved factors—such as the duration of the conduct—that have
not been explicitly accepted as relevant to Gore’s three-factor analysis.92
Are these other factors relevant? Unfortunately, the Court’s discussion and
application of specific factors has not adequately addressed these
problems. Addressing the vagueness of reprehensibility by focusing on
factors relevant to reprehensibility has been made more difficult by the
Court’s ad hoc treatment of other factors that are usually relevant to
punishment. More specifically, the Court has adopted an ad hoc approach
in addressing recidivism and the risk of potential harm from the
defendant’s misconduct.
(1) Recidivism
Gore recognized that recidivism is relevant to reprehensibility because
“repeated misconduct is more reprehensible than an individual instance of
malfeasance.”93 Gore also noted:
Habitual offender statutes permit the sentencing court to
enhance a defendant’s punishment for a crime in light of prior
convictions, including convictions in foreign jurisdictions. A
sentencing judge may even consider past criminal behavior
which did not result in a conviction and lawful conduct that
bears on the defendant’s character and prospects for
rehabilitation.94

. . . [This] does not mean that evidence describing out-of-state transactions is
irrelevant in a case of this kind. . . . [S]uch evidence may be relevant to the
determination of the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.
Gore, 517 U.S. at 572–73, 574 n.21 (footnote omitted).
90. See supra notes 2–6, 39, 53, 58 and accompanying text.
91. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419 (“The existence of any one of these factors weighing in favor
of a plaintiff may not be sufficient to sustain a punitive damages award; and the absence of all of
them renders any award suspect.”).
92. See infra note 155.
93. Gore, 517 U.S. at 577.
94. Id. at 573 n.19 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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Williams also recognizes this point.95 However, Campbell limits this
principle in the punitive damages context:
A defendant’s dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon
which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for
punitive damages. A defendant should be punished for the
conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory
individual or business.
. . . Although “[o]ur holdings that a recidivist may be
punished more severely than a first offender recognize that
repeated misconduct is more reprehensible than an individual
instance of malfeasance,” in the context of civil actions courts
must ensure the conduct in question replicates the prior
transgressions.96
The Court adopts this special rule of replicating prior transgressions,
applicable only for civil actions, simply by fiat; no reasons are given. The
closest thing to a reason is a reference to TXO Production Corp., which
indicated that “courts should look to ‘the existence and frequency of
similar past conduct.’”97 However, TXO Production Corp. held only that
such conduct is relevant; it did not hold that only such conduct is
relevant.98
(2) Actual and Potential Harm from the Misconduct
One might expect that the amount of actual or potential harm would be
a factor in determining reprehensibility under Gore’s test. In the criminal
law, both actual and potential harm are relevant to culpability and thus to

95. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1065 (2007). In support of the view
that risk of harm to many is more reprehensible than risk to only a few, the Court offers the
following citation to authority:
Cf., e.g., Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 400 (1995) (recidivism statutes
taking into account a criminal defendant’s other misconduct do not impose an
“‘additional penalty for the earlier crimes,’ but instead . . . ‘a stiffened penalty for
the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because a
repetitive one’” (quoting Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948))).
Id. (alteration in original).
96. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 422–23 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Gore,
517 U.S. at 577).
97. Id. at 423 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 n.28
(1993)).
98. See id.
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amount of punishment,99 though the pattern of imposing lessened
punishments for attempts, as opposed to completed crimes, indicates that
actual harm has more weight than potential harm.100 Though having
recognized that the amount of harm is relevant to the amount of punitive
damages, the Court’s treatment of actual and potential harm in this context
has been inconsistent in two respects.
First, the Court has been inconsistent in deciding whether to measure
the amount of harm in terms of reprehensibility or in terms of ratio. Gore
separates actual and potential harm from the analysis of reprehensibility
and treats it separately as the second factor in its three-factor
analysis—i.e., as the ratio of the amount of punitive damages to the harm
involved.101 In applying this second factor, the Court considered actual
harm to Gore and to other in-state victims of the fraud and noted that none
of the victims were threatened by any other potential harm.102 However,
Williams and Campbell adopt a different approach because these cases
treat harm to third parties as a factor relevant to reprehensibility.103
Second, Williams adopts a contradictory (or at least confusing)
approach in addressing potential harm to third parties. Prior to Williams,
the Court treated actual and potential harm to third parties the same way.
For example, TXO Production Corp. stated:
It is appropriate to consider the magnitude of the potential
harm that the defendant’s conduct would have caused to its
intended victim if the wrongful plan had succeeded, as well
as the possible harm to other victims that might have resulted
if similar future behavior were not deterred. In this case the
State Supreme Court of Appeals concluded that TXO’s
pattern of behavior “could potentially cause millions of
dollars in damages to other victims.”104
99. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 164–65 n.9, 166 (1976) (approving capital
punishment under Georgia’s scheme, which included the following in a list of ten aggravating
circumstances required for imposition of death penalty: “The offender by his act of murder, armed
robbery, or kidnapping knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public
place by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than
one person”); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 11.1–12.4 (4th ed. 2003) (discussing crimes
of solicitation, attempt, and conspiracy).
100. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 11.5, at 611 (noting that the most common approach
in modern reconfigurations of criminal statutes treats attempts as “a crime one degree below the
object crime”).
101. Gore, 517 U.S. at 580–83.
102. Id. at 582.
103. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1065 (2007); Campbell, 538 U.S.
at 422–24.
104. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460–61 (1993) (quoting TXO
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 889 (W. Va. 1992), aff’d, 509 U.S. 443
(1993)).
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Williams appears to be consistent with TXO Production Corp. because
Williams contains language such as the following: “[W]e recognize that
conduct that risks harm to many is likely more reprehensible than conduct
that risks harm to only a few. And a jury consequently may take this fact
into account in determining reprehensibility.”105 However, Williams also
contains language indicating that actual harm to third parties is relevant to
reprehensibility and that potential harm to others is not relevant. More
specifically, the Court stated:
We have said that it may be appropriate to consider the
reasonableness of a punitive damages award in light of the
potential harm the defendant’s conduct could have caused.
But we have made clear that the potential harm at issue was
harm potentially caused the plaintiff.
. . . Evidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to
show that the conduct that harmed the plaintiff also posed a
substantial risk of harm to the general public, and so was
particularly reprehensible—although counsel may argue in a
particular case that conduct resulting in no harm to others
nonetheless posed a grave risk to the public, or the
converse.106
If this language imposes a limit on potential harm to third parties,107 the
Court offers no justification for this limit. Instead, as with its ad hoc
treatment of recidivism, the Court adopts the limit simply by fiat.108 In
addition, by suggesting that “counsel may argue” that the defendant’s
actions “posed a grave risk to the public,” even though no harm to others
resulted, the Court contradicts its own position that only potential harm to
the plaintiff is relevant. If potential harm to third parties is not relevant,
why is it permissible for counsel to argue about third-party risk where no
harm to others resulted?
105. Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1065.
106. Id. at 1063–64.
107. The language is hard to interpret for two reasons. First, Williams involved only actual
third-party harm, and Williams emphasized the distinction between punishing third-party harm and
using third-party harm to assess reprehensibility. Second, the passages from which the language
is taken provide only limited assistance in interpretation.
108. The Court claimed support from language referring to potential harm to the plaintiff in
Campbell and in TXO Production Corp. See Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1063. However, neither
Campbell nor TXO Production Corp. explicitly addresses the issue of potential harm to third
parties. Moreover, to the extent that TXO Production Corp. addresses potential harm to third
parties, it appears to view such harm as relevant. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 459–60
(noting that a man who recklessly fired a gun into a crowd could reasonably be subjected to
substantial punitive damages, even if only ten dollars in property damage resulted, because of the
need to deter such acts in the future). For further discussion of this point, see infra notes 186–90
and accompanying text.
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Perhaps Campbell and Williams—which are the two most recent cases
and which together not only appear to bar evidence of potential third-party
harm but also apply a narrow technical approach to actual third-party
harm—indicate that the Court is moving toward excluding any
consideration of actual or potential harm to others. This exclusion would
be consistent with the Court’s concerns about the treatment of alleged
harm to persons who are not parties to the litigation. For example,
Campbell notes:
Due process does not permit courts, in the calculation of
punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties’
hypothetical claims against a defendant under the guise of the
reprehensibility analysis . . . . Punishment on these bases
creates the possibility of multiple punitive damages awards
for the same conduct; for in the usual case nonparties are not
bound by the judgment some other plaintiff obtains. (“Larger
damages might also ‘double count’ by including in the
punitive damages award some of the compensatory, or
punitive, damages that subsequent plaintiffs would also
recover”).109
Similarly, in arguing that punitive damages awards cannot be used to
punish a defendant for wrongful harm to a third party (though they could
be used to determine the amount of reprehensibility and thus the amount
of the punitive award), Williams notes:
[A] defendant threatened with punishment for injuring a
nonparty victim has no opportunity to defend against the
charge, by showing, for example in a case such as this, that
the other victim was not entitled to damages because he or
she knew that smoking was dangerous or did not rely upon
the defendant’s statements to the contrary.
. . . [T]o permit punishment for injuring a nonparty victim
would add a near standardless dimension to the punitive
damages equation. How many such victims are there? How
seriously were they injured? Under what circumstances did
injury occur? The trial will not likely answer such questions
as to nonparty victims. The jury will be left to speculate.110
Barring any consideration of harm to third parties would provide, at
least, a bright-line standard. It would also eliminate the contradictory and
confusing notion in Williams that the jury can consider such harm in
assessing reprehensibility, which affects the amount of punitive damages,
109. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003) (quoting BMW
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 593 (1996) (Breyer J., concurring)).
110. Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1063.
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but cannot “directly” punish the defendant for such harmful conduct.
However, such a position about third parties would considerably expand
substantive due process limits on imposing punitive damages, particularly
in terms of traditional concepts of reprehensibility, retribution, and
deterrence. Given the lack of any theoretical basis for such an expansion,
this fundamental change in the common law would be very
questionable.111 In the meantime, because the Court has, at most, only
hinted at such a bar, the lower courts have even less clarity for applying
the Gore factors and clarifying those factors through appellate
adjudication.
b. Ratio of Punitive Damages to Actual (and Potential) Damages
As with reprehensibility, the Court treats its ratio factor in a
contradictory manner. With both reprehensibility and ratio, the Court
claims that the framework is not only flexible but also rigid enough to
structure and limit discretion. This dual approach has caused the Court to
take conflicting positions concerning the ratio of a punitive damages award
to actual and potential harm. One position stresses flexibility and the
inability to “‘draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally
acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable [ratio] that would fit
every case.’”112 “[T]here are no rigid benchmarks that a punitive damages
award may not surpass . . . [because t]he precise award in any case, of
course, must be based upon the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s
conduct and the harm to the plaintiff.”113 Thus,
low awards of compensatory damages may properly support
a higher ratio than high compensatory awards, if, for
example, a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a
small amount of economic damages. A higher ratio may also
be justified in cases in which the injury is hard to detect or the
monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been
difficult to determine.114
Under this approach, in TXO Production Corp., the Court approved a
punitive award that was 526 times larger than the actual damages award
because of the potential for substantial harm to others (and for substantial

111. See infra notes 161–223 and accompanying text.
112. Gore, 517 U.S. at 582–83 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 458); see, e.g., id. at
582 (“[W]e have consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line is marked by a simple
mathematical formula.”); Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425 (“We decline again to impose a bright-line
ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed.”).
113. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425.
114. Gore, 517 U.S. at 582.
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gain to the defendant) if the defendant’s conduct continued.115 This flexible
approach to ratio also permitted the Court to disapprove in Gore a 35-to-1
ratio of punitive damages to the amount of actual harm suffered by Gore
and the other Alabama victims.116
The Court’s use of various specific ratios to suggest a more precise
formula reflects the opposing position. For example, the Court has stated:
• “When the ratio is a breathtaking 500-1, . . . the award
must surely ‘raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow.’”117
• “[A different approach to review might apply] if the
State’s scheme . . . defined punitive damages as a multiple
of compensatory damages (e.g., treble damages).”118
• “[A]n award of more than four times the amount of
compensatory damages might be close to the line of
constitutional impropriety.”119
• “[T]here is a presumption against an award that has a 145to-1 ratio.”120
• “[F]ew awards exceeding single-digit ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant
degree, will satisfy due process. . . . Single-digit
multipliers are more likely to comport with due
process . . . than awards with ratios in range of
500-1.” 121
Given the Court’s repeated assertions that there is no test and given the
wide variation in the Court’s proposed “formulas,” lower courts are left
with considerable discretion but are given very little guidance on how to
exercise that discretion.
115. TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 459–60. The Court also noted that, if potential harm to the
plaintiff were also considered, the ratio would be 10-to-1 or less. See id. at 451, 462 (ratio of $10
million punitive damages award to conservative estimate of $1 million in potential harm). In terms
of deterrence, the Court also recognized the relevance of “possible harm[s] to other victims that
might have resulted if similar future behavior were not deterred.” Id. at 460.
116. Gore, 517 U.S. at 582 n.35. The ratio was 500-to-1 if only the harm to Gore were
considered. Id. at 582.
117. Id. at 582 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 481 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
118. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 440 n.13 (2001).
119. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). The
“questionable” nature of such an award was initially raised in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co.
v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1991), and was reiterated in Gore, 517 U.S. at 581.
120. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 426.
121. Id. at 425.
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The Court’s contrasting approaches concerning the harm to be
compared with the amount of the punitive damages award has also
complicated the task of determining an appropriate ratio. As indicated
above,122 Gore indicates that the actual and potential harm to the plaintiff
and to in-state third parties should be addressed in terms of their ratio to
punitive damages. In contrast, Campbell and Williams address third-party
harm in terms of reprehensibility.123 Williams adds additional contrast to
Gore and earlier cases because Williams appears to regard potential harm
as completely irrelevant.124 Finally, the consideration of third-party harm
has been complicated by the tension between language in some opinions
stressing that determining actual harm to third parties involves
considerable uncertainty and the Court’s continued recognition of the
relevance of third-party harm.125
The treatment of ratio is also complicated by the Court’s considerable
ambivalence about the importance of mental trauma in calculating ratio.
Gore notes that conduct is more reprehensible if the victim suffers “mental
fear, torture, and agony of mind”126 and that a higher ratio may “be
justified in cases in which . . . the monetary value of noneconomic harm
might have been difficult to determine.”127 However, Campbell contains
conflicting statements about noneconomic harm. On the one hand, the case
repeats Gore’s statement that a higher ratio may be necessary where
“‘the monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult to
determine.’”128 On the other hand, the following statement in Campbell
suggests that the presence of noneconomic harm indicates that a lower
ratio is appropriate:
The compensatory damages for the injury suffered here,
moreover, likely were based on a component which was
duplicated in the punitive award. Much of the distress was
caused by the outrage and humiliation the Campbells suffered
at the actions of their insurer; and it is a major role of punitive
damages to condemn such conduct. Compensatory damages,
however, already contain this punitive element.129
The treatment of mental distress is important to the final result in
Campbell in two respects. First, on remand, the Utah Supreme Court
122. See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 101–02, 104–08 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 101–11 and accompanying text.
126. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 n.24 (1996).
127. Id. at 582.
128. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (quoting Gore,
517 U.S. at 582).
129. Id. at 426.
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disagreed with the U.S. Supreme Court’s equivocal treatment of mental
distress.130 Instead, the Utah Supreme Court emphasized that the psychic
harm to the plaintiffs was “more closely akin to physical assault or trauma
than to mere economic loss.”131 Second, the Utah Supreme Court noted
that the trial court’s findings in support of a reduction in actual damages
from $2.6 million to $1 million showed that the award had been “purged
of elements which may have been more properly placed in the category of
punitive damages.”132 Based on these and other reasons, the Utah Supreme
Court imposed a punitive damages award of $9,018,780.75, a 9-to-1
ratio.133
Partly because it has rejected any substantial role for deterrence as a
purpose of punitive damages,134 the Court has not been receptive to a
number of factors that would indicate the need for a higher ratio to
improve deterrence. More specifically, the Court has been reluctant to
recognize the revelance of the difficulty of detection and likelihood of
being sanctioned,135 the costs of litigation,136 the possibility of financial
gain,137 the potential harm to third parties,138 or the defendant’s wealth.139
c. Criminal and Regulatory Sanctions
Though comparing a punitive damages award to civil and criminal
penalties for the same conduct arguably provides an “objective” measure
of the proper amount of punitive damages, there are several fundamental
problems with this measure. First, because there is no objective measure
of “comparable,” identifying comparable misconduct may be difficult. For
example, why did the Court compare the fraud involved in Gore to
Alabama’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act140 but not to any possible
criminal theft offenses based on fraud?141 The Court has recognized this
problem in discussing the amount of punishment for criminal conduct. In
this context, the Court has noted that “[o]ne cannot compare the sentences
130. See Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 98 P.3d 409, 415 (Utah 2004).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 418.
133. Id. The Utah Supreme Court noted that insurance policies are purchased partly for peace
of mind and that State Farm deliberately chose to “callously betray[] [plaintiffs’] expectation of
peace of mind,” including the trauma caused by the “risks and rigors of a trial” and from being told
by State Farm that they should sell their house to deal with this liability. See id. at 414–17.
134. See infra Part IV.D.1.
135. See infra notes 177–83 and accompanying text.
136. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 184–85 and accompanying text.
138. See supra text accompanying note 106; infra notes 186–90 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 191–96 and accompanying text.
140. BMW of N. Am. , Inc., v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 583–84 (1996) (citing A LA .
C O D E § 8-19-11(b) (1993)).
141. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (“Theft by
Deception”); LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 19.7 (false pretenses).
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imposed by the jurisdiction for ‘similarly grave’ offenses if there is no
objective standard of gravity. Judges will be comparing what they consider
comparable.”142 Second, where conduct might also result in imprisonment,
comparing a prison term with a monetary punitive sanction will be
difficult, if not impossible. Third, comparing punishments would involve
similar difficulties if the regulatory sanctions include loss of a license or
some other prohibition on the conduct of business.143 Fourth, the criminal
and regulatory fines may be too low to attain the proper amount of
retribution or deterrence.144 For example, the amount of a criminal fine
might be low because the legislature viewed imprisonment, which is
inapplicable to corporations, as the primary means of achieving the
purposes of the punitive scheme. Because of these problems, many state
courts have treated this factor as inapplicable in some situations.145 For
example, in dealing with Gore on remand from the Supreme Court, the
Alabama Supreme Court concluded:
Because the legislature has set the statutory penalty for
deceitful conduct at such a low level, there is little basis for
comparing it with any meaningful punitive damages award,
particularly where the defendant is wealthy and the profit
gained from the fraudulent act is substantial. In this case, the
maximum statutory penalty does not even remove the profit
BMW realized from the sale of the damaged automobile to
Gore. Accordingly, a consideration of the statutory penalty
does little to aid in a meaningful review of the excessiveness
of the punitive damages award.146

142. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 988 (1991).
143. See, e.g., Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2003)
(“[D]efendant would prefer to pay the punitive damages assessed in this case than to lose its
license.”); Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 98 P.3d 409, 418 n.8 (Utah 2004) (noting,
on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, that State Farm’s conduct might justify “termination of
its license, a penalty that surely would cost it more than” the $10,000 fine for a first-degree felony).
144. See, e.g., Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal
Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1426–27 (1993) (noting that railroad companies ignored
minimal fines for failing to take required steps to prevent fires but addressed these preventive steps
after a large punitive damages award).
145. See, e.g., Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., 113 P.3d 63, 78 (Cal. 2005) (“The third
guidepost is less useful in a case . . . where plaintiff prevailed only on a cause of action involving
‘common law tort duties that do not lend themselves to a comparison with statutory penalties.’”
(quoting Cont’l Trend Res. v. OXY USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 641 (10th Cir. 1996))); Aken v. Plains
Elec. Generation & Transmission Coop., Inc., 49 P.3d 662, 672 (N.M. 2002) (noting
“dissatisfaction with the comparison urged by the third guidepost”); James v. Horace Mann Ins.
Co., 638 S.E.2d 667, 671–72 (S.C. 2006) (finding that the third guidepost was not useful in
reviewing the punitive damages award); Campbell, 98 P.3d at 419 (noting, on remand from the U.S.
Supreme Court, that the comparison can be “quixotic” and that the maximum fine for a first-degree
felony in Utah was $10,000).
146. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 701 So. 2d 507, 514 (Ala. 1997).
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Since adopting the Gore test, the Supreme Court has not recognized
these problems with the third factor.147 In Campbell, for example, the
Court noted that it was not necessary to “dwell long on this guidepost”
because “[t]he most relevant civil sanction under Utah state law for the
wrong done to the Campbells appears to be a $10,000 fine for an act of
fraud, an amount dwarfed by the $145 million punitive damages award.”148
But, on remand, the Utah Supreme Court went beyond mechanical
comparisons to “dwell long on this guidepost.” In particular, the Utah
Supreme Court noted the following: (1) the actual damages were
$1 million, an amount that would support a punitive award of $1 million
(a 1:1 ratio), and this award would also dwarf the $10,000 fine, (2)
revocation of State Farm’s license to underwrite insurance in Utah was a
possible penalty, and (3) “a legislature can be quixotic,” as shown by the
fact that $10,000 was also the maximum fine for a first-degree felony, “the
classification assigned our most serious crimes.”149
The U.S. Supreme Court’s treatment of regulatory and criminal
sanctions, as shown by its feeling that there was no need “to dwell long on
this guidepost” in Campbell, indicates that it is oblivious to (or at least
unconcerned about) a number of aspects of the American political and
legal systems. The most obvious overlooked point is that because
imprisonment, which does not apply to corporations, is the primary
method of punishment for criminal misconduct, the amount of a fine, if
any, may be a legislative afterthought. The Court’s failure to recognize this
point fits with its general lack of any concern for the unique problems
involved with punishing corporate actors.150 The Court has also failed to
consider that Americans are, at best, ambivalent about regulation of
business. This ambivalence results in a tendency to limit both the power
and the funding of regulatory agencies. In addition, regulation of business
is resisted by and shaped by business itself through political contributions,
lobbying, and efforts to “capture” agencies.151
147. Haslip approved a punitive damages award that was “much in excess of the fine that
could be imposed.” Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991). However, Haslip was
decided before the Gore test was adopted.
148. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 428 (2003) (citation omitted).
Rather than address the problems described in the text above, the Court minimized the relevance
of criminal sanctions. For example, while noting that “a criminal penalty does have bearing on the
seriousness with which a State views the wrongful action,” the Court noted that “[w]hen used to
determine the dollar amount of the award, . . . the criminal penalty has less utility.” Id.
149. Campbell, 98 P.3d at 418–19. The Utah Supreme Court imposed a punitive award of
$9,018,780.75, a 9-to-1 ratio. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
150. See infra notes 212–23 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE
OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 14–15 (2002); SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 84–86, 101–02;
Richard L. Abel, Questioning the Counter-Majoritarian Thesis: The Case of Torts, 49 DEPAUL L.
REV. 533, 535–46 (1999); Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A
Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1130–33 (1954); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and
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Because of these aspects of American business regulation, judicial
enforcement of private rights through compensatory damages awards in
the tort system has become an important part of deterring wrongful
conduct, such as the negligent design of automobiles.152 Where
compensatory damages alone are inadequate for deterrence or for
satisfying the need for retribution, the tort system also needs the option of
using punitive damages awards to provide additional liability, particularly
because legislators and regulators may consider the tort system’s role
when setting legislative and regulatory sanctions.153 Given that business
entities often succeed in limiting both the likelihood and the amount of
regulatory and criminal sanctions, state courts should be free to use their
common-law power to proceed independently in assessing punitive
damages awards. In addition, these courts need to be free to provide a
punitive damages award of sufficient size to encourage private attorneys
the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1050–52 (1997); A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 928 (1998)
(arguing that one reason for skepticism about the utility of other sanctions is that “[s]uch penalties
are influenced in part by political factors—interest group pressures, logrolling, and the like. . . .
[And these factors] may themselves be influenced by the possibility of punitive damages awards
in private suits: public penalties might be low precisely because legislators believed that punitive
damages awards would create effective deterrence”); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in
Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1296 (1986) (noting a pattern where agencies
“exhibited a consistent bias in favor of the interests of politically influential constituents”).
152. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
68–94 (1970); Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A Philosophical Inquiry,
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 99, 104–08 (David G. Owen ed., 1995). Even when
no wrongdoing is involved, imposing compensatory liability for accident costs provides an
incentive to reduce injuries not currently preventable by due care by lowering the level of activity
or by seeking innovations that result in new, more cost-effective safety measures. See Ind. Harbor
Belt R.R. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir. 1990); CALABRESI, supra, at 73,
155; Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055, 1082 (1972); Mark Geistfeld, Should Enterprise Liability Replace the Rule of Strict Liability
for Abnormally Dangerous Activities?, 45 UCLA L. REV. 611, 652–63 (1998).
153. See, e.g., David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH.
L. REV. 1257, 1277–95 (1976) (discussing how punitive damages help to punish the defendant,
deter future crimes, encourage private people to bring claims, and compensate plaintiffs); Polinsky
& Shavell, supra note 151, at 928 (arguing that legislative sanctions may be low “because
legislators believed that punitive damages awards would create effective deterrence”); infra notes
177–78 and accompanying text (discussing the role of likelihood of detection in efficient
deterrence). Prevention is achieved not only by the negative impact of compensatory and punitive
liability on a wrongdoer but also by several related effects of liability. These other effects are (1)
assuring careful members of society that it is not foolish to conform their behavior to legal norms
of safety, (2) conveying a strong message about social disapproval of certain types of conduct and
thus strengthening moral frameworks, and (3) inculcating the habit of obeying the law. See F.
Patrick Hubbard et al., A “Meaningful” Basis for the Death Penalty: The Practice,
Constitutionality, and Justice of Capital Punishment in South Carolina, 34 S.C. L. REV. 391,
546–49 (1982); Dorothy Thornton et al., General Deterrence and Corporate Environmental
Behavior, 27 LAW & POL’Y 262, 263–67 (2005).
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general to seek punitive damages.154 This encouragement is necessary
because prosecutors and regulators often lack the resources needed for
effective investigation and enforcement. In addition, their salary-based
compensation scheme eliminates any entrepreneurial incentive like that of
plaintiffs’ attorneys to sanction improper conduct by business enterprises.
The Court’s mechanical, uncritical reliance on regulatory and criminal
sanctions as a measure of punitive damages ignores all these
considerations about regulatory schemes and the role of tort law.
C. Novelty and Utility
According to Haslip, under Alabama’s scheme of judicial review of
punitive damages awards,
the following could be taken into consideration in
determining whether the award was excessive or inadequate:
(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the
punitive damages award and the harm likely to result from the
defendant’s conduct as well as the harm that actually has
occurred; (b) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s
conduct, the duration of that conduct, the defendant’s
awareness, any concealment, and the existence and frequency
of similar past conduct; (c) the profitability to the defendant
of the wrongful conduct and the desirability of removing that
profit and of having the defendant also sustain a loss; (d) the
“financial position” of the defendant; (e) all the costs of
litigation; (f) the imposition of criminal sanctions on the
defendant for its conduct, these to be taken in mitigation; and
(g) the existence of other civil awards against the defendant
for the same conduct, these also to be taken in mitigation.155
154. See infra notes 207–08 and accompanying text.
155. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1991). Haslip also indicates that the
instruction to the jury “expressly described for the jury the purpose of punitive damages, namely,
‘not to compensate the plaintiff for any injury’ but ‘to punish the defendant’ and ‘for the added
purpose of protecting the public by [deterring] the defendant and others from doing such wrong in
the future.’” Id. at 19 (alteration in original) (quoting Joint Appendix, Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (No. 891279), 1990 WL 10023011, at *105–06). The Court concluded as follows:
[T]he instructions gave the jury significant discretion in its determination of
punitive damages. But that discretion was not unlimited. It was confined to
deterrence and retribution, the state policy concerns sought to be advanced. And
if punitive damages were to be awarded, the jury “must take into consideration the
character and the degree of the wrong as shown by the evidence and necessity of
preventing similar wrong.” The instructions thus enlightened the jury as to the
punitive damages’ nature and purpose, identified the damages as punishment for
civil wrongdoing of the kind involved, and explained that their imposition was not
compulsory.
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Haslip also indicates that a court must undertake this review “to ensure
that the award does ‘not exceed an amount that will accomplish society’s
goals of punishment and deterrence.’”156 By endorsing the Alabama
scheme used in Haslip, the Court showed lower courts that there were
substantive limits on the imposition of punitive damages awards and that
a state could satisfy these limits by following the Alabama scheme. Not
surprisingly, state courts took the hint and, if necessary, conformed their
scheme to the one approved in Haslip.157
The Court never indicated why its framework is better than the
framework approved in Haslip. Instead, the Court simply adopted its threepart test in Gore because it thought that the Alabama scheme approved in
Haslip failed to prevent the Alabama courts from denying BMW its
substantive rights under the Due Process Clause.158 However, there is no
reason to believe that the Gore factors will prevent any such abuse more
effectively than the Haslip factors. The lists of factors are very similar.
Items (a) and (b) listed in Haslip are the same as the Gore factors of
degree of reprehensibility and of ratio of punitive damages to
compensatory damages. Gore adds the comparison to other sanctions, but
as indicated above, this factor is very questionable, and some state
supreme courts have not applied it under some circumstances, including
the Alabama Supreme Court when it addressed Gore on remand.159 In
addition, the Gore framework omits the more detailed guidance provided
by items (c) through (g) in the Alabama scheme. In short, Gore adds one
new but highly debatable and frequently useless consideration, and omits
details about other relevant considerations. These details can help lower
courts attempting to satisfy due process requirements. On the whole,
therefore, Gore adds little that is novel and useful, and omits much that is
helpful.
D. Theoretical Basis
The Court’s development of its substantive due process framework has
been characterized by a preference for ad hoc decisions instead of the

Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Joint Appendix, supra, at *106).
156. Id. at 21 (quoting Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 222 (1989)).
157. See, e.g., Gamble v. Stevenson, 406 S.E.2d 350 (S.C. 1991) (adopting post-trial review
standards for punitive damages awards in South Carolina to conform with Haslip); Garnes v.
Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 908–09 (W. Va. 1991) (specifying that the review of
punitive damages awards in West Virginia would follow the dictates of Haslip).
158. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575–85 (1996) (applying the threefactor test); id. at 586–97 (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that Alabama’s framework had been
abused).
159. See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying text.
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construction of an underlying theoretical framework. As a result, the Court
has not justified its emphasis on retribution to such a degree that the
deterrent purpose of punitive damages has been virtually eliminated from
consideration. Similarly, the Court has applied to punitive damages ad hoc
distinctions that do not generally apply to other punitive sanctions and has
failed to develop a coherent theoretical perspective on the role of punitive
damages in controlling corporate misconduct. Finally, the Court has relied
on a concern for federalism as the basis for imposing limitations on a state’s
interference with other states, but it has given little weight to the federalism
concern of limiting federal interference with a state’s sovereignty.
1. Purposes of Punishment
As a part of its limited theoretical scheme to support its substantive
framework, the Court has stated that compensatory damages address the
need to redress the harm a plaintiff suffers,160 while punitive damages
serve the purposes of deterrence and retribution.161 Consequently, a court
must instruct the jury that punitive damages are imposed for these
purposes, not for compensation.162 In addition, a punitive award that
grossly exceeds the amount necessary to serve these two purposes violates
due process.163 Retribution appears to have a greater role than deterrence
in the framework because the Court has stressed that the amount of
punitive damages “should fit the crime” and that “punitive damages should
be ‘commensurate to the nature of the offence.’”164 As a result, a court may
impose a substantial punitive damages award—even if a lesser punishment
would be sufficient to achieve “efficient” or “economically optimal”
deterrence—if the punishment imposed constitutes just desert for
particularly reprehensible conduct.165
160. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001).
161. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568. The Court sometimes states that the purposes are to punish and
deter. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 432 (listing the purposes of punitive damages as
punishment and deterrence); Gore, 517 U.S. at 568 (“Punitive damages may properly be imposed
to further a State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.”).
However, because of the tautological nature of “punishing to punish,” it is better to refer to
retribution as one of the goals.
162. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1991) (approving Alabama’s jury
instructions in which the juries were told that punitive damages were not for compensating the
plaintiff). Haslip also approved the following as a way to explain the purposes of punishment:
“[T]he jury ‘must take into consideration the character and the degree of the wrong as shown by
the evidence and necessity of preventing similar wrong.’” Id. (quoting Joint Appendix, supra note
155, at *106).
163. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (“The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive
or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor.”).
164. Gore, 517 U.S. at 575 n.24 (quoting Burkett v. Lanata, 15 La. Ann. 337, 339 (1860)).
165. See Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 438–40. For example, the Court noted:
[I]t is not at all obvious that even the deterrent function of punitive damages can

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol60/iss2/2

30

Waldman and Hubbard: In Honor of Walter O. Weyrauch: Substantive Due Process Limits on

2008]

SU BSTAN TIVE D U E PRO C ESS LIM ITS O N PU N ITIVE D AM AG ES AW ARD S

379

In developing its substantive framework, the Court has modified the
traditional retributive approach in one respect. Retributive schemes
generally share two common tenets.166 First, the person being punished
“deserves” the punishment imposed because he has committed an offense
and the amount of punishment is proportional to the reprehensibility of
both the offense and the offender.167 Second, punishment in accordance
with the defendant’s “just desert” is legitimate, regardless of whether it
will prevent any future offenses, because, for example, the punishment
“restores a balance to the ‘moral order.’”168 Consistent with this approach,
recidivists are punished more severely than first-time offenders because of
the recidivists’ increased reprehensibility.169 However, as indicated above,
the Court has limited this recidivism principle in the context of punitive
damages to conduct that “replicates” the conduct that harmed the
plaintiff.170
In death penalty cases, the Court has similarly emphasized retribution
and proportionality when applying the Eighth Amendment prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment. Because capital punishment constitutes just
desert for egregious murders, the Constitution permits capital punishment
in this situation even if no additional deterrence results from execution
rather than life imprisonment.171 In contrast, capital punishment for the
rape of an adult is unconstitutional—regardless of any possible additional
deterrent impact resulting from imposing the only penalty greater than life
imprisonment—because capital punishment is not proportionate to the
crime.172
be served only by economically “optimal deterrence.” “[C]itizens and legislators
may rightly insist that they are willing to tolerate some loss in economic
efficiency in order to deter what they consider morally offensive conduct, albeit
cost-beneficial morally offensive conduct; efficiency is just one consideration
among many.”
Id. at 439–40 (second alteration in original) (quoting Galanter & Luban, supra note 144, at 1450).
166. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 231 (1968); MARY MARGARET
MACKENZIE, PLATO ON PUNISHMENT 21–33 (1981); EDMUND L. PINCOFFS, THE RATIONALE OF
LEGAL PUNISHMENT 2–16 (1966); Hugo Adam Bedau, Retribution and the Theory of Punishment,
75 J. PHIL. 601, 602–03 (1978).
167. See HART, supra note 166, at 231.
168. See Hubbard et al., supra note 153, at 534–37.
169. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 517–18 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he assumption that death provides a greater deterrent than other penalties is unsupported by
persuasive evidence. Instead, the interest that we have identified as the principal justification for
the death penalty is retribution . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
172. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977); see, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,
432–33 (1980) (finding the death penalty unconstitutional where defendant’s crime was not “more
‘depraved’ than that of any person guilty of murder”); Steven F. Shatz, The Eighth Amendment, the
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However, in its cases addressing state schemes for punishing
recidivists, the Court has given far less weight to the retributive concern
for proportionality and has upheld draconian prison sentences for repeat
offenders, partly because deterrence and incapacitation justified imposing
such severe punishments.173 These two justifications were also involved in
Harmelin v. Michigan,174 which held that the Eighth Amendment did not
bar imposing a statutory mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without
parole for a first-time drug offender.175 Harmelin noted that the amount of
punishment imposed for a crime
depends, of course, upon the weight the society accords to
deterrence and rehabilitation, rather than retribution, as the
objective of criminal punishment (which is an eminently
legislative judgment). In fact, it becomes difficult even to
speak intelligently of “proportionality,” once deterrence and
rehabilitation are given significant weight. Proportionality is
inherently a retributive concept . . . .176
In the context of punitive damages, the Court has rejected Harmelin’s
approach. Instead, the Court itself has made the “eminently legislative
judgment” that retribution has more weight than deterrence. Based on this
judgment, the Court has been unsympathetic to increasing the amount of
punitive damages above the amount of a defendant’s “just desert” to
achieve additional deterrence. For example, although the Court has
stressed the role of retribution as a reason to limit the amount of punitive
damages or to exceed economically optimal punishment, it has given little
weight to the view that, to achieve “efficient” deterrence, the amount of
punishment must vary not only in terms of reprehensibility and amount of
harm but also in terms of probability of detection. As noted in Harmelin:
“[S]ince deterrent effect depends not only upon the amount of the penalty
but upon its certainty, crimes that are less grave but significantly more
difficult to detect may warrant substantially higher penalties.”177 Gore
Death Penalty, and Ordinary Robbery–Burglary Murderers: A California Case Study, 59 FLA. L.
REV. 719, 721–23 (2007) (describing the “national standard” set by the Supreme Court, “requiring
the states to exclude from death eligibility those defendants who commit murders not deemed
sufficiently aggravated by the nation as a whole”).
173. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29–30 (2003); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370,
374–75 (1982); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284–85 (1980). But see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277, 279, 303 (1983) (holding that a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for a seventh
nonviolent offense was unconstitutional).
174. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
175. Id. at 994–95.
176. Id. at 989 (emphasis added).
177. Id.; see Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 243–46 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi,
J., concurring); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 221, 226–27 (7th ed. 2007);
Hubbard et al., supra note 153, at 544–45; see also Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 151, at 888–91

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol60/iss2/2

32

Waldman and Hubbard: In Honor of Walter O. Weyrauch: Substantive Due Process Limits on

2008]

SU BSTAN TIVE D U E PRO C ESS LIM ITS O N PU N ITIVE D AM AG ES AW ARD S

381

noted that a “higher ratio may . . . be justified in cases in which the injury
is hard to detect.”178
Some opinions, however, appear to eliminate or minimize this
detection concern. For example, though Justice Breyer’s concurring
opinion in Gore indicated that, in terms of deterrence, the amount of a
punitive award for conduct causing a particular amount of total harm
should become larger as the “number of successful lawsuits that would
likely be brought” gets smaller, he also noted “that the Constitution ‘does
not incorporate the [efficient deterrence] views of the Law and Economics
School’”179 and that there was nothing in the record “suggesting that the
Alabama Supreme Court . . . applied any ‘economic’ theory that might
explain the $2 million recovery” in Gore.180 Justice Kennedy, writing for
the Court in Campbell, showed similar ambivalence. Addressing the ratio
of punitive damages to compensatory damages, he noted that “a higher
ratio might be necessary where ‘the injury is hard to detect.’”181 However,
his opinion appears to ignore this concern and to focus solely on
retribution because it simply concluded that “the argument that State Farm
will be punished in only the rare case . . . had little to do with the actual
harm sustained” by the plaintiffs.182
Detection of wrongdoing is of limited deterrent value if that
wrongdoing is not sanctioned. Therefore, plaintiffs must bring suit if
punitive damages are to provide the deterrent sanction. For this reason, the
Alabama scheme involved in Haslip included this concern as a factor.183
Since Haslip, however, the Court has not considered the possible need for
a higher punitive award to encourage plaintiffs to litigate against a deeppocketed corporation. Similarly, though TXO Production Corp. noted that
the possibility for “tremendous financial gains” was relevant to the amount
of punitive damages,184 the Court has not included that factor in its analysis
(arguing that when a wrongdoer causes $100,000 in harm to each victim but has only a 25% chance
of detection, he should be liable for $400,000, not just $100,000, so that he will be concerned about
the 75% of cases where his wrong is not detected and he will thus be optimally deterred).
178. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996).
179. Id. at 593 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 300 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
180. Id. But see Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 440 n.13
(2001) (indicating that de novo appellate review might not be appropriate where a jury was
constrained to impose only an amount of punitive damages “necessary to obtain economically
optimal deterrence”).
181. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (quoting Gore,
517 U.S. at 582).
182. Id. at 427.
183. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22 (1991). For an example of a lower
federal court using this factor, see infra note 193 and accompanying text.
184. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 461 (1993). The Alabama scheme
in Haslip also included profitability and the need to deter by imposing a loss as a factor to consider.
See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 22.
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of ratio in terms of the Gore factors even where it would seem
appropriate.185
The Court’s rejection of deterrence as a goal, as well as its ad hoc
approach to reprehensibility, are also shown by the Court’s position that
potential harm to third parties is not relevant to the amount of punitive
damages.186 This exclusion conflicts with the focus of deterrence on
preventing harmful acts in the future. “[I]t is the known tendency of acts
which makes it desirable to prevent them, regardless of the particular
results of any one commission.”187 As the Court noted in TXO Production
Corp., the state court’s imposition of a large punitive award was based in
part on the conclusion that “TXO’s pattern of behavior ‘could potentially
cause millions of dollars in damages to other victims.’”188 TXO Production
Corp. also noted that a man who wildly fires into a crowd but damages
only a pair of glasses worth ten dollars could reasonably be subjected to
substantial punitive damages to deter such dangerous acts in the future.189
The reference to shooting at the crowd, rather than to shooting at the
owner of the glasses, indicates that potential harm to third parties is
important in terms of deterrence. From a retributive perspective, this
conduct seems more reprehensible as well.190 Nevertheless, Williams
appears to bar consideration of the risk of potential harm to third parties.
The Court has also deemphasized the relevance of the wealth of a
defendant to the amount of the punitive damages award necessary to deter
that defendant (and defendants with similar wealth) from future
misconduct. From an economic perspective, wealth is relevant to
deterrence by monetary sanctions.
[F]ines should be proportional to the criminal’s wealth, quite
apart from any notions of a just distribution of wealth. The
principle of diminishing marginal utility of income implies
that a heavier fine is necessary to impose the same disutility
on a rich as on a poor person. . . . The point is not that
equalizing disutilities is an aim in itself, but that optimal
deterrence may require price discrimination against the
wealthy.191
185. For example, in dealing with Gore on remand, the Alabama Supreme Court noted that
the maximum statutory penalty would not remove the profit that BMW received from the sale to
Gore. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text.
187. Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1181 (1931).
188. TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 460–61 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp.,
419 S.E.2d 870, 889 (W. Va. 1992), aff’d, 509 U.S. 443 (1993)).
189. Id. at 459–60. The Court presented this scenario by quoting a selection from Garnes v.
Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 902 (W. Va. 1991), which took the example from Morris,
supra note 187, at 1181.
190. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
191. POSNER, supra note 177, at 228. But see, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 151, at
910–14 (“[F]rom the perspective of achieving proper deterrence, a defendant’s wealth generally
should not be considered when the defendant is a corporation . . . [and] the wealth criterion
frequently should not be considered when the defendant is an individual . . . .”).
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In addition, the wealth of a defendant is relevant to the use of plaintiffs as
private attorneys general.192 Wealth enables
the defendant to mount an extremely aggressive defense
against suits such as this and by doing so to make litigating
against it very costly, which in turn may make it difficult for
the plaintiffs to find a lawyer willing to handle their case,
involving as it does only modest stakes, for the usual 33–40
percent contingent fee.193
By minimizing the relevance of these points in determining the amount
of punitive damages, the Court has allowed its preference for retribution
to trump considerations of wealth and deterrence. For example, in
Campbell the Court implicitly acknowledged the role of wealth in
deterrence by stating that it is not “unlawful or inappropriate” to consider
wealth in assessing punitive damages.194 However, the Court then gave
retribution far greater weight than deterrence, asserting that the wealth of
the defendant “‘cannot make up for the failure of other factors, such as
“reprehensibility,” to constrain significantly an award that purports to
punish a defendant’s conduct.’”195 In other words, wealth is relevant to
deterrence and therefore may be considered, but wealth has no impact on
the retributive concern for proportionality and thus no impact on the
amount of punishment.
The quote from Campbell concerning the “failure of other factors” in
the preceding paragraph comes out of Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion
in Gore. In this opinion, Justice Breyer went even further and rejected any
relevance for substantial wealth in terms of deterrence. He argued as
follows:
Since a fixed dollar award will punish a poor person more
than a wealthy one, one can understand the relevance of this
factor to the State’s interest in retribution (though not
necessarily to its interest in deterrence, given the more distant
relation between a defendant’s wealth and its responses to
economic incentives).196

192. See infra notes 207–08 and accompanying text.
193. Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding an
award of $5,000 in compensatory damages and $186,000 in punitive damages based on a deliberate
choice by a motel chain, with an aggregate net worth of $1.6 billion, to expose guests to bed bug
bites rather than exterminate the motel properly).
194. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 428 (2003) (quoting BMW
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 591 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
195. Id. (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 591 (Breyer, J., concurring)); see, e.g., Gore, 517 U.S. at
591 (Breyer, J., concurring) (expressing concern that wealth “provides an open-ended basis for
inflating awards when the defendant is wealthy”).
196. Gore, 517 U.S. at 591 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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This contradictory combination of accepting the concept of diminishing
marginal utility in terms of poverty and retribution but not in terms of
wealth and deterrence suggests a dislike for (or rejection of) economic
theories of deterrence. These theories might have flaws, but such flaws do
not support using the Due Process Clause to deny a state the right to apply
these widely accepted theories in adopting an approach to deterrence.
The Court has likely granted so little weight to deterrence concerns
such as probability of detection and wealth of the defendant for two
interconnected reasons. First, deterrence provides a basis for punishments
that are excessive in the sense that they are not proportional to
wrongdoing. As noted in Harmelin, once deterrence is given significant
weight, “it becomes difficult even to speak intelligently of
‘proportionality.’”197 Consequently, a jury might impose a punitive
damages award that is “disproportionately” high in terms of retribution to
deter wrongdoing that is hard to detect or committed by wealthy
defendants. Campbell illustrates the Court’s concern for preventing this
result, noting that using wealth in a deterrence framework “‘provides an
open-ended basis for inflating awards when the defendant is wealthy.’”198
The Court treats such “open-ended” inflation of punishment as
permissible in legislative schemes for imprisoning humans, like that in
Harmelin. However, the Court’s second concern—fear of jury abuse in
determining the amount of a punitive damages award to be imposed on a
corporate defendant—results in different treatment for punitive damages
awards. Because of this concern and the Court’s distrust of the ability or
willingness of lower appellate courts to control jury abuse, the Court views
the impact of wealth on deterrence as suspect in the context of punitive
damages. Two examples convey the sense of the numerous expressions of
this concern for jury abuse.199 Oberg requires de novo review partly
because “evidence of a defendant’s net worth creates the potential that
juries will use their verdicts to express biases against big businesses,
particularly those without strong local presences.”200 TXO Production
Corp. noted that a jury instruction to consider a defendant’s wealth—“in
recognition of the fact that effective deterrence” may require a larger fine
on a wealthy defendant—“increased the risk that the award may have been
influenced by prejudice against large corporations, a risk that is of special
concern when the defendant is a nonresident.”201

197. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
198. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 427–28 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 591 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
199. For expressions of this concern for abuse by judges and juries in addition to those in the
main text, see infra notes 239–48 and accompanying text.
200. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994).
201. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 463–64 (1993). The Court did
not address the constitutionality of such an instruction in TXO Production Corp. because this issue
had not been preserved. Id. at 464.
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2. Failure to Address Relevant Perspectives on Punishment
One reason the Court’s substantive framework has such an ad hoc
quality is that the opinions contain very little theoretical discussion of two
important perspectives on punishment. First, although the Court
distinguishes between punishment in the civil tort system and punishment
in the regulatory and criminal systems, the Court fails to develop any basis
for the distinctions it emphasizes.202 Second, although all eight of its cases
have involved the imposition of punitive awards on corporate entities, the
Court has not meaningfully addressed the unique issues concerning the
purpose and effectiveness of punishing corporate entities.
a. Private Civil Punishment
Punitive damages awards differ from both regulatory and criminal
sanctions in numerous ways. First, the amount of punitive damages is
initially set by the jury, rather by an agency or a court using a statute, a
regulation, or a set of sentencing guidelines. In part, this approach is used
for punitive damages because, as the Court has noted, each case is unique
and requires flexibility.203 The jury plays an important role in fitting the
amount of the award to the circumstances involved by providing useful
input about community views and attitudes about reprehensibility and the
relative importance of retribution and deterrence. In addition, a jury
provides a human dimension to the process of addressing misconduct by
the public, charitable, and profit-motivated corporate bureaucracies that
dominate our lives. From the human point of view, the criminal and
regulatory systems are, to a considerable extent, no different from other
bureaucratic organizations granted the status of artificial persons. In
contrast, the jury provides a necessary direct input, unaffected by
bureaucratic roles and agendas, from ordinary natural persons in
addressing any misconduct by artificial persons.204 Moreover, judges and
juries are less susceptible to political influences and capture by corporate
interests than legislators, prosecutors, or administrators.205 Thus, courts
play an important role in preventing corporate misconduct by imposing
both compensatory and punitive damages. Given the widespread adoption
of legislative schemes to limit the amount of punitive damages awards,206
any state without such a scheme has, in effect, an implicit legislative
endorsement of that state’s common-law scheme for determining the
amount of punitive damages.
202. See supra notes 93–111 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
204. See generally Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and Its
Users, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 1369 (2006) (discussing the development and nature of artificial persons
(APs) and the role of law in the interrelation of APs and natural persons).
205. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 8.
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Another major difference between regulatory and criminal fines and
punitive damages is that the punitive damages are awarded to private
litigants rather than the government. Though this arguably results in a
windfall to the plaintiff, any windfall is justified, in part, by the need to
encourage plaintiffs to serve as private attorneys general.207 Legislative
schemes in some states grant the state a share of a punitive damages
award, and these schemes reflect this concern because they provide
plaintiffs with a sufficient amount of the award to encourage plaintiffs to
seek punitive damages.208
A third difference is that defendants in tort suits may face multiple
suits, each seeking a punitive award, where multiple parties are injured by
the same conduct. However, similar problems exist in the criminal and
regulatory system because the prosecuting entity has discretion whether
and how to combine charges of specific unlawful acts. In civil claims, the
problem of multiplicity is not limited to common-law awards of punitive
damages. The problem also arises in statutory schemes authorizing private
plaintiffs to seek both compensatory damages and some form of “punitive”
damages. Because these schemes may involve automatic multipliers like
treble damages, the problem is potentially worse with statutory schemes.
For example, the Alabama system approved of in Haslip addresses the
potential multiplicity of claims for common-law punitive damages by
including “the existence of other civil awards against the defendant for the
same conduct” as a mitigating factor.209
Punitive damages also differ from criminal sanctions in other important
ways, particularly in procedural protections like the “beyond a reasonable
doubt” standard of proof210 and the limited role of discovery to obtain
information from the defendant. The criminal justice system requires such
procedural protections because criminal sanctions can be far more severe,
particularly for human defendants, and can have serious secondary
consequences—such as severe social censure, loss of a license, or
diminished civil rights—that do not accompany punitive damages awards.

207. See Galanter & Luban, supra note 144, at 1441–42, 1445–46; David G. Owen, A Punitive
Damages Overview: Functions, Problems, and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 380–81 (1994); supra
note 154 and accompanying text. This desire to secure private enforcement of both private rights
and public interests underlies the widespread use of legislative schemes authorizing punitive
damages, treble damages, and attorney fees. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140 (2006) (damages
for unfair trade practices); Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, “Crimtorts” as Corporate Just
Deserts, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 289, 305–07, 325–27, 342–43 (1998).
208. See Hubbard, supra note 8, at 505, 509.
209. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
210. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 428 (2003) (noting
“heightened protections of a criminal trial”). Some states have adopted the reasonable-doubt
standard for proving the egregious conduct necessary for imposing punitive damages. See, e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-127 (2007) (Civil actions—degree of proof required).
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Despite the importance of these differences, the Court has not
addressed them or placed them within any theoretical framework. Instead,
the Court has used an ad hoc approach to exclude, for example, recidivism
and potential harm to third parties from the determination of the amount
of punitive damages, even though such factors are relevant to the amount
of punishment in the criminal-punishment system.211 In time, courts may
develop such ad hoc distinctions in more detail, and these details may
reduce some of the uncertainty caused by the lack of a broader, more
systematic theory. However, uncertainty is only part of the problem.
Distinctions imposed by fiat, no matter how clear the distinctions may be,
raise serious questions about the legitimacy of the Court’s substantive
framework.
b. Punishment of Corporations
To a considerable degree, the Court’s substantive framework is
designed for large corporate defendants. All the cases, including the early
twentieth-century cases relied upon as precedent in TXO Production
Corp.,212 involved relatively large corporations. In addition, the Court has
stressed that the Due Process Clause protects corporations.213 Further, the
Court has defended its substantive due process framework in terms of a
perceived need to protect corporations, particularly out-of-state
corporations, from “the potential that juries will use their verdicts to
express biases against big businesses, particularly those without strong
local presences.”214 Finally, large corporations are more likely than
individual humans to have the funds to pay the substantial punitive
damages awards that seem to attract the Court’s attention.215
Despite this close relationship between the due process framework and
corporate defendants, the Court’s punitive damages decisions have not
addressed the problems affecting both deterrence and retribution that arise
211. See supra notes 93–111 and accompanying text.
212. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453–54 (1993); supra notes
62–64 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585 (1996) (“The fact that BMW
is a large corporation . . . does not diminish its entitlement to fair notice . . . .”).
214. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994); see infra note 245 and
accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1061 (2007) (noting that the
company was ordered to pay $79.5 million in punitive damages); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 412 (2003) (noting that the company was ordered to pay $145 million
in punitive damages); Gore, 517 U.S. at 562–63 (noting that the company was ordered to pay $2
million in punitive damages); TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 446 (noting that the company was
ordered to pay $10 million in punitive damages); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 7
n.2 (1991) (noting that the company was ordered to pay approximately $840,000 in punitive
damages).
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when punishing corporations.216 A corporation “has no soul to be damned,
and no body to be kicked.”217 Given the corporation’s lack of a “soul,”
punishing a corporation based on retribution raises conceptual problems.
For example, punishing in accord with just desert supposedly restores a
balance to the “moral order.”218 Such moral concerns are largely
inapplicable to a corporate entity, which cannot feel emotions like shame,
guilt, or empathy. In contrast, given the profit motive of corporate
businesses and of the humans filling roles within them, and given the
possible harms that can result from corporate misconduct, deterring
misconduct by fines and punitive damages has considerable appeal.219 The
Court recognized this point in Haslip, which held that imposing punitive
damages on the basis of the doctrine of respondeat superior did not violate
due process because imposing liability on this basis “rationally advances
the State’s goal” of deterrence.220
However, the Court has emphasized retribution rather than deterrence
in addressing the amount of punitive damages awards. This retributive
emphasis has reduced the effectiveness of punitive damages to deter
corporate misconduct because this emphasis precludes punishing a
defendant in excess of just desert regardless of whether the excess would
achieve a preferable level of deterrence.221 Under the Court’s framework,
the concept of just desert limits punishment for the purpose of deterrence
in the case of corporations but not for humans. As a result, humans can be
treated more harshly because retributive concerns do not bar a
disproportionate statutory term of imprisonment where that term is
necessary for deterrence.222 Emphasizing retribution in punishing
corporations has also caused the Court to be, at best, suspicious of
increasing deterrence by increasing the amount of punitive damages where
216. Courts and scholars alike have discussed the range of these problems. See, e.g., Ciraolo
v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 248–49 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., concurring); POSNER,
supra note 177, at 456–58. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to
Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386
(1981) (discussing the problems arising in the context of corporate punishment and suggesting ways
they can be fixed); Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319
(1996) (critiquing corporate criminal punishment in terms of economically efficient deterrence);
Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 833 (2000)
(arguing for a more retributive justification for corporate punishment); Andrew Weissman & David
Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411 (2007) (arguing for a different
model for achieving deterrence through corporate punishment for criminal conduct).
217. Coffee, supra note 216, at 386 (quoting the Lord Chancellor of England, Edward, First
Baron Thurlow, 1731–1806, quoted in MERVYN KING, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE CORPORATION 1
(1977)).
218. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 173–96 and accompanying text.
220. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 14–15. This is the same standard that the Court has adopted for
criminal punishment of corporations since its initial approval of such punishment in 1909. See N.Y.
Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495–96 (1909).
221. See supra notes 173–201 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 175–76 and accompanying text.
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the likelihood of detection is low, litigation costs are high, the gain to the
defendant is substantial, or the defendant is wealthy.223
3. Federalism and Interstate Commerce
Campbell and Gore both prohibit imposing punitive damages to punish
out-of-state conduct. As indicated above,224 the Court based this
prohibition more on concerns for federalism and interstate commerce than
on substantive due process. This Article does not address the Court’s
reliance on these concerns to limit punishing out-of-state conduct.225
However, these federalism concerns cannot justify a national framework
addressing nonfederalism issues like the relative roles of retribution and
deterrence. Consequently, the Court has relied on the Due Process Clause
to impose its ad hoc national framework, based largely on the retributive
concept of just desert and on its views about measuring reprehensibility.
This scheme limits a state’s right to assess punishment in accordance with
its views of retribution and just desert by denying a state’s right to
emphasize the deterrent role of punitive damages. This severe hampering
of a state’s ability to use the common-law tort system to deter corporate
misconduct within its borders is both a highly suspect use of the Due
Process Clause and contrary to another basic concern of federalism:
preventing the federal government from interfering with a state’s
sovereignty.226
IV. REASON FOR IMPOSING A NECESSARILY VAGUE FRAMEWORK
A. “Wild” Verdicts
The Court’s substantive due process framework raises three interrelated
questions. The first addresses the institutional issue of whether the Court,
which is composed of unelected federal judges, should use the Due
Process Clause to impose a necessarily vague substantive framework on
states. Given the Court’s recognition of its reliance on Lochner-era
precedents,227 and given the general suspicion of Lochner-era judicial
activism228 and of substantive due process in general,229 one might expect
223. See supra notes 173–201 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
225. For a criticism of the Court’s use of federalism as a basis for its substantive framework,
see Michael P. Allen, The Supreme Court, Punitive Damages and State Sovereignty, 13 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1, 3 (2004).
226. See Spencer, supra note 63, at 1097–98.
227. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
228. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (“As the history of
the Lochner era demonstrates, there is reason for concern lest the only limits to such judicial
intervention become the predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of this Court.
That history counsels caution and restraint.”); David. E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82
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the decisions imposing the substantive due process framework for punitive
damages to address this issue in some detail. However, to the extent that
the Court has addressed this question, the decisions speak only to a need
to address cases of extreme abuse. For example, TXO Production Corp.
purported to deal with the concern for legitimacy by listing and discussing
precedents supporting a constitutional limit on the amount of a monetary
penalty a state may impose.230 However, the cited precedents, by
themselves, simply recognize the very broad principle that there is, at
some point, a limit.231 As the Court notes, only one of these “‘Lochner-era
precedents’” reversed a penalty.232 Moreover, because that one barred a
state from imposing any punishment “for conduct . . . undertaken in
complete good faith,”233 the amount of the punitive sanction was not a
concern. This broad principle underlies Haslip’s defense of the initial
adoption of due process limits: “One must concede that unlimited jury
discretion—or unlimited judicial discretion for that matter—in the fixing
of punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar one’s
constitutional sensibilities.”234 However, Haslip noted that Alabama’s
system limited jury discretion, and partly for this reason, the Court’s
“constitutional sensibilities” were not jarred.
A second issue concerns timing: Why, in the 1990s—many decades
after establishing the broad principle that there must be some substantive
limit to address extreme abuse—did the Court feel it necessary not only to
reassert the principle in Haslip and TXO Production Corp. but also to give
it detailed form and reverse awards in Gore, Campbell, and Williams?
Apparently, the Court felt that the existing common-law system for
imposing punitive damages awards was not “working” and that, as a result,
extreme abuse was occurring. Though Haslip approved the Alabama
scheme, a model set up to limit discretion and prevent abuse might, in
practice, fail to prevent abuse. Therefore, the Court “‘cannot simply
assume the model works as intended; [the Court] must critique [the
TEX. L. REV. 1, 2–11 (2003) (“Avoiding ‘Lochner’s error’ remains a primary focus of constitutional
law and constitutional scholarship.”).
229. See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271–72 (1994) (“‘As a general matter, the
Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because the
guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.’”
(quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992))).
230. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453–55 (1993).
231. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
232. TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 454 & n.17, 455 (quoting Brief of Respondents, TXO Prod.
Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (No. 92-479), 1993 WL 469320, at *17).
233. Id. at 454 n.17. In the case, a patron of the company successfully sued to recover a
statutory penalty of $6,300 ($100 per day for 63 days) for unreasonable discrimination. Sw. Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 485 (1915). This penalty was unconstitutional because there
was “no departure from any prescribed or known standard of action . . . [and] no mode of judicially
testing the regulation’s reasonableness in advance of acting under it.” Id. at 490–91.
234. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
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model’s] performance in terms of its results.’”235 This concern with results
became explicit in Gore, which involved the same Alabama scheme that
the Court approved in Haslip. Despite Alabama’s use of this scheme in
Gore, the Court found that the award involved was grossly excessive. As
noted in Breyer’s concurring opinion, “[T]he rules that purport to channel
discretion in this kind of case, here did not do so in fact.”236
Assessing a model’s legitimacy by reviewing its results presents a third
issue: Are any failures typical of the system or simply rare aberrations in
an otherwise well-functioning scheme? Initially, the Court thought that the
system was functioning reasonably well. For example, Haslip adopted a
respectful view of the lower courts’ imposition of punitive damages
awards and adopted the following presumption: “Assuming that fair
procedures were followed, a judgment that is a product of that process is
entitled to a strong presumption of validity. Indeed, there are persuasive
reasons for suggesting that the presumption should be irrebuttable . . . .”237
Thus, the Court appears to view any problems as rare mistakes. However,
both before and after Gore, some opinions explicitly assert that a
substantive due process model, no matter how vague or ad hoc, must be
imposed because the common-law system malfunctions on far too broad
a scale. In particular, despite Haslip’s views about the strong presumption
in favor of the process of jury trials and judicial control of the jury process
and about the need for discretion in awarding punitive damages on a caseby-case basis,238 many of the dissenting opinions in earlier cases indicate
a distrust of juries239 and state courts,240 and a concern that punitive
damages have “run wild.”241

235. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 338 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting F.
Patrick Hubbard, “Reasonable Levels of Arbitrariness” in Death Sentencing Patterns: A Tragic
Perspective on Capital Punishment, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1113, 1162 (1985) (criticizing a death
penalty scheme on the basis of patterns of results indicating racial discrimination)).
236. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 595 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring).
237. TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 457.
238. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
239. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 500–01 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[M]any
courts continue to provide jurors with skeletal guidance that permits the traditional guarantor of
fairness—the jury itself—to be converted into a source of caprice and bias.”); Haslip, 499 U.S. at
43 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Multimillion dollar losses are inflicted on a whim.”).
240. See, e.g., Haslip, 499 U.S. at 55 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Alabama’s grant of
standardless discretion to juries is not remedied by post hoc judicial review.”).
241. Id. at 18 (majority opinion); see, e.g., Gore, 517 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Today we see the latest manifestation of this Court’s recent and increasingly insistent ‘concern
about punitive damages that “run wild.”’” (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18)); TXO Prod. Corp., 509
U.S. at 475 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court and its Members have expressed concern
about punitive damages awards ‘run wild,’ inexplicable on any basis but caprice or passion.”).
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This distrust stems from a view that the size and frequency of punitive
awards have increased sharply in recent years,242 a concern for the wide
discretion granted to juries,243 substantial disagreement with the exercise
of discretion by state courts in particular cases,244 and a desire to foster a
national marketplace where commerce occurs without undue risk that a
state will wrongfully extract money from “wealthy” corporations,
particularly out-of-state corporations.245 Justice O’Connor has been the
most outspoken about these concerns.246 For example, her dissenting
opinion in Browning-Ferris asserted:
Awards of punitive damages are skyrocketing. As recently
as a decade ago, the largest award of punitive damages
affirmed by an appellate court in a products liability case was
$250,000. Since then, awards more than 30 times as high
have been sustained on appeal. The threat of such enormous
awards has a detrimental effect on the research and
development of new products. Some manufacturers of
prescription drugs, for example, have decided that it is better
to avoid uncertain liability than to introduce a new pill or
vaccine into the market. Similarly, designers of airplanes and
motor vehicles have been forced to abandon new projects for
fear of lawsuits that can often lead to awards of punitive
damages.

242. See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
243. See, e.g., Haslip, 499 U.S. at 42–43, 46, 50 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“States routinely
authorize civil juries to impose punitive damages without providing them any
meaningful instructions on how to do so. . . . Multimillion dollar losses are inflicted on a
whim. . . . Alabama . . . gives civil juries complete, unfettered, and unchanneled
discretion . . . . Alabama’s ‘standards’ in fact provide no guidance . . . .”).
244. See, e.g., Gore, 517 U.S. at 586–97 (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing reasons why the
presumption of validity of state court discretion was overcome under the circumstances).
245. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 464 (indicating concern that evidence of the
defendant’s wealth “increased the risk that the award may have been influenced by prejudice
against large corporations, a risk that is of special concern when the defendant is a nonresident”);
id. at 489–91 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that “it seems quite likely that the jury in fact was
unduly influenced by the fact that TXO is a very large, out-of-state corporation,” and asserting that
the instructions “encouraged the jury to transfer some of TXO’s impressive wealth to the”
plaintiffs, that “jurors may view large corporations with great disfavor,” that “jurors naturally think
little of taking an otherwise large sum of money out of what appears to be an enormously larger
pool of wealth,” and that “juries may feel privileged to correct perceived social ills stemming from
unequal wealth distribution by transferring money from ‘wealthy’ corporations to comparatively
needier plaintiffs”); supra notes 200–01 and accompanying text.
246. See TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 475, 500 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Haslip, 499 U.S.
at 43, 46–47, 61–62 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelsco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Bankers
Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 87–88 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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The trend toward multimillion dollar awards of punitive
damages is exemplified by this case.247
In Gore, the majority accepted Justice O’Connor’s characterization of the
system.248 Though the Court has not regarded the problem as common
enough to prohibit all jury assessments of punitive damages awards, it has
allowed its distrust of the state courts to overcome any presumption in
favor of their decisions and has imposed both the procedural framework
and the substantive framework discussed herein.
B. Critique
There are two fundamental problems with the Court’s reliance on its
concern for “wild” verdicts to impose its due process scheme. First, the
substantive framework can reduce “mistakes” only if it is sufficiently clear
to guide lower courts or if the Court can exercise meaningful review of the
flow of state and federal decisions imposing punitive damages awards. As
indicated above, neither of these alternatives are realistic.249 Rather than
address this difficulty, the Court adopted the Gore three-factor test, which
is based on the following contradictory position: Because Alabama’s
vague set of common-law guidelines for awarding punitive damages failed
to prevent a denial of substantive due process in awarding punitive
damages, the Court must impose its own set of guidelines, even though the
Court’s guidelines are basically the same as Alabama’s guidelines in terms
of content and vagueness, and even though the Court can review only a
small fraction of cases applying its guidelines.
Second, the Court adopted the position that punitive damages awards
have “run wild” with virtually no critical analysis. Justice O’Connor’s
opinions, which contain the most detail concerning the assertion that
punitive damages awards are “skyrocketing,”250 typify this lack of analysis.
She supported her assertions by referring to myriad sources: a RAND
Institute study of punitive awards in California and Chicago published in
1987,251 a Wall Street Journal article,252 an opinion by the Ninth Circuit,253
247. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 282 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citations omitted).
248. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 583–84.
249. See supra notes 73–80 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
251. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 61 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor cited this study in
support of two assertions: (1) “[r]ecent years . . . have witnessed an explosion in the frequency and
size of punitive damages awards,” and (2) “punitive damages were assessed against 1 of every 10
defendants who were found liable for compensatory damages in California.” Id. (citing MARK
PETERSON, SYAM SARMA, & MICHAEL SHANLEY, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, PUNITIVE
DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS iii, viii (1987), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/
2006/R3311.pdf.). Her use of this study is both superficial and selective. For example, she never
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several state court appellate opinions sustaining large punitive damages
awards,254 an amicus curiae brief filed by the Pharmaceutical

indicates that the study noted the following: (1) “awards are frequently reduced by post-trial
actions,” PETERSON, SARMA & SHANLEY, supra, at viii, 26–30, (2) its “findings . . . are limited,”
id. at ix, (3) “most punitive damage awards are modest,” id. at 17, (4) the increase in number and
amount of punitive awards involved many intentional torts, id. at 12, 38, 46 tbl.4.2, and (5) the ratio
of punitive damages to compensatory damages tended to be low in California, with medians
ranging from 0.6 to 1.4 and averages ranging from 1.5 to 4.4, id. at 40–41 & tbl.3.7.
252. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 61–62 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing L. Gordon Crovitz, Rule of
Absurd Punitive Damages Also “Mock” Due Process, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 1990, at A19). This
very short piece contains anecdotal reports, unsupported conclusory assertions (“[P]unitive
damages are routine”), and rhetorical references, such as “fear of unpredictable liability,” “absurd
tort,” and the need to defuse “the litigation bomb.” Crovitz, supra.
253. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 62 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The amounts ‘seem to be limited only
by the ability of lawyers to string zeroes together in drafting a complaint.’” (quoting Oki Am., Inc.
v. Microtech Int’l, Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinski, J., concurring))). The court
in Oki America affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff on the
defendant’s counterclaim for the tort of bad-faith denial of the existence of the contract. 872 F.2d
at 314. The concurring opinion disagreed with the policy choices involved in California’s
recognition of the tort and viewed this recognition as an example of the general decline of tort law.
Id. at 315–16 (Kozinski, J., concurring). To support his disagreement with punitive damages, the
concurring judge cited and stated the awards in two cases. Id. at 315. One of these cases was
apparently a miscitation because the case involved only the reversal of the grant of a motion to
dismiss. See April Enters., Inc. v. KTTV, 195 Cal. Rptr. 421, 423 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). The other
case involved a deliberate trespass and knowing destruction of the plaintiff’s hedge row that had
little economic value (which was the basis of a $10 compensatory award), but had great aesthetic
value to its owners, and the harm caused by the loss of this personal aesthetic value played a role
in the appellate court’s decision to assess a punitive damages award of $14,500. See Klimek v.
Hitch, 124 Ill. App. 3d 997, 998–99 (1994).
254. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Durrill, 714
S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), vacated per agreement of parties, 754 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. 1988),
Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 319 S.E.2d 470 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984), and Palmer v. A.H. Robins
Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984)). In Durrill, which was later vacated by agreement of the parties,
a young woman sustained fatal burn injuries from a fuel tank explosion caused by a collision, and
on appeal the plaintiffs were awarded $2.3 million in compensatory damages and $10 million in
punitive damages, a ratio of slightly more than 4-to-1 for grossly negligent conduct involving
serious injury and death. Durrill, 714 S.W.2d at 333, 346–47. Stubblefield also involved a young
woman who suffered burns and death when a collision caused the car she was in to be engulfed by
fire. Stubblefield, 319 S.E.2d at 473. The appellate court upheld an $8 million punitive damages
award, in part because the evidence showed that Ford had made a “conscious decision to deter
implementation of safety devices in order to protect its profits . . . [and possibly] realize a design
cost savings of $20.9 million.” Id. at 481. The plaintiff in Palmer suffered the loss of a fetus from
a spontaneous abortion as well as the loss of her uterus, fallopian tubes, and ovaries, as a result of
the defendant’s deliberate choice “to profit by making exaggerated statements regarding the safety
and efficacy of its product.” Palmer, 684 P.2d at 196–97, 204. The defendant’s sales revenues from
the product exceeded $11 million. Id. at 197–98. Based on this evidence, the appellate court upheld
compensatory damages of $600,000 and punitive damages of $6.2 million. Id. at 221.
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Manufacturers Association,255 a book by Peter Huber,256 and four law
review articles.257 Justice O’Connor’s use of these authorities is flawed in
three basic respects. First, she did not attempt to place the verdict
information in context, whether in terms of statistics about the tort system
generally or in terms of the facts of the cases imposing the verdicts
referred to in the appellate opinions or in the articles.258 Nor did she
attempt to address more recent studies of punitive damages that indicate
punitive damages awards are not “wild.”259 Second, she did not attempt to
255. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 282 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Brief of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Ass’n & the American Medical Ass’n, as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Browning-Ferris, 494 U.S. 257 (No. 88-556), 1989 WL 1127717).
256. Id. (citing PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES 152–71 (1988)).
257. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 500 (1993) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting); Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 282 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). O’Connor’s dissent in TXO Prod. Corp. noted:

As little as 30 years ago, punitive damages awards were “rarely assessed” and
usually “small in amount.” [Dorsey D.] Ellis, [Fairness and Efficiency in the Law
of Punitive Damages,] 56 S. CAL. L. REV. [1,] 2 [(1982)]. Recently, however, the
frequency and size of such awards have been skyrocketing. One commentator has
observed that “hardly a month goes by without a multimillion-dollar punitive
damages verdict in a product liability case.” [Malcolm E.] Wheeler, A Proposal
for Further Common Law Development of the Use of Punitive Damages in
Modern Product Liability Litigation, 40 ALA. L. REV. [919,] 919 (1989). And it
appears that the upward trajectory continues unabated. See [William H.] Volz &
[Michael C.] Fayz, Punitive Damages and the Due Process Clause: The Search
for Constitutional Standards, 69 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 459, 462[] n.17 (1992).
TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 500 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (formatting added); see also
Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 282 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“As
recently as a decade ago, the largest award of punitive damages affirmed by an appellate court in
a products liability case was $250,000.” (citing Owen, supra note 153, at 1329–32)).
258. See supra notes 251, 253–54.
259. For more recent studies, see, for example, Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and
Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1, 31, 41–43 (1990) (noting that punitive damages
are awarded infrequently and not large); Theodore Eisenberg, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Martin T.
Wells, Reconciling Experimental Incoherence with Real-World Coherence in Punitive Damages,
54 STAN. L. REV. 1239, 1241–43 (2002) (“[R]esearchers have not identified either a crazy pattern
of awards or a substantial series of actual punitive damage awards that constitute a shocking pattern
of incoherence or unfairness.”); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages:
An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 745 (2002) (finding punitive awards rare, especially
in products liability cases); Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The Predictability of Punitive
Damages Awards in Published Opinions, the Impact of BMW v. Gore on Punitive Damages
Awards, and Forecasting Which Punitive Awards Will Be Reduced, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 59, 61
(1999) (finding no significant difference in patterns before and after Gore and finding predictability
in outcome of appellate review); Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive
Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 624 (1997) (presenting evidence to show that juries are reliable
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develop a conceptual framework for determining whether any increase in
the size of punitive damages awards is occurring “too fast” or whether any
increase results from prior awards that were “too low” to prevent corporate
misconduct or from more recent awards that were “too high.” Third, she
seems to simply accept, without qualification, not only Huber’s book,
which has been described as a strident polemic against the tort system as
a whole260 but also self-serving factual assertions in the brief filed on
behalf of drug manufacturers.
The net result is that Justice O’Connor and the other members of the
majority simply accepted, without any critical analysis, the rhetoric used
by the “tort reform” movement in its push for a wide range of changes in
tort law to favor defendants in tort litigation.261 This uncritical acceptance
has played a crucial role in the Court’s punitive damages decisions,
particularly the Court’s treatment of the state courts. More specifically, the
Court has gone from the strong presumption in favor of decisions by state
courts adopted in Haslip to a scheme of de novo review by the Court based
on, and accompanied by, a pattern of “bashing” common-law judges. In
effect, the Court has used the Due Process Clause to impose itself as the
highest common-law court in the land in order to “reform” tort law
punitive damages in a manner that reduces the states’ ability to sanction
corporate misconduct.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article does not challenge the Supreme Court’s position that, at
some point, the Due Process Clause limits the amount of punitive damages
that can be assessed. Instead, this Article focuses on the problems resulting
from the Court’s approach to developing a framework for imposing that
limit. The Court’s initial decisions in developing this framework were
helpful because its concern for imposing substantive limits generated
and predictable); Hubbard, supra note 8, at 503–04 (discussing studies); David Luban, A Flawed
Case Against Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 359, 360–62 (1998) (summarizing studies of punitive
damages awards); Neil Vidmar & Mary R. Rose, Punitive Damages by Juries in Florida: In
Terrorem and in Reality, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487, 512–13 (2001) (finding that, except for
asbestos cases, punitive damages were not awarded in products liability cases and that awards were
not extremely large).
260. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo’s Retort: Peter Huber’s Junk Scholarship, 42 AM.
U. L. REV. 1637, 1641–42 (1993) (stating that Huber’s work does not appear to be “a serious work
of legal research or thought”).
261. For discussion of “tort reform” rhetoric used by this “movement” of repeat players on the
defense side, see Hubbard, supra note 8, at 474–79 (noting, for example, rhetorical expressions of
concern about a “litigation explosion,” “judicial hellholes,” “lawsuit abuse,” “looney lawsuits,” and
“dishonorable courts”). For an argument that cases like Williams indicate a pattern in the Court’s
recent decisions of helping business by reducing liability and litigation costs for business
defendants, see, for example, Richard Brust, John Gibaut & Jason Krause, The Company Line,
A.B.A. J., Oct. 2007, at 50, 54–55.
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useful dialogue about those limits and its endorsement of the Alabama
scheme in Haslip provided a workable framework for state courts to use
in imposing punitive damages. In Gore, however, the Court began
imposing its own framework, which added only the questionable factor of
comparison with other sanctions and omitted helpful relevant factors
included in the Haslip scheme. Disagreeing with some of the lower courts’
applications of the necessarily vague Gore/Haslip framework, the Court
abandoned any presumption in favor of decisions by state common-law
courts and undertook fact-based reviews of specific applications of the
framework by lower courts. It has also adopted ad hoc details like the
distinction involved in Williams. The Court has done these things without
developing a coherent theory about the purpose of punitive damages, the
role of private civil punishment, or the punishment of corporations. The
Court’s ad hoc approach increases uncertainty about both the content and
application of the framework, and its uncritical adoption of a scheme based
on distrust and disvaluing of common-law judges and juries weakens the
tort system’s ability to prevent corporate misconduct.
If the Court continues this approach, there will be considerable
uncertainty as courts struggle to determine the answers to questions like
the following: What is an instruction that will satisfy Williams?262 Will
evidence of similar injury to third parties continue to be relevant and
admissible?263 If so, how will “similar” be defined and will potential injury
to third parties be relevant?264 Every two years or so, the Court may issue
a new decision that may resolve some of this uncertainty but will also
require retrials or other reconsideration of cases where the lower courts
guessed wrong. Periodically, the Court may also simply reverse an
application of the framework like it did in Gore. Given the Court’s failure
to develop a coherent theoretical foundation for its substantive framework,
continuing to impose its views in an ad hoc manner will raise questions of
legitimacy. This ad hoc imposition will also increase the likelihood that
cases imposing substantive limits on the amount of punitive damages will
provide examples that support Llewellyn’s assertion that “morals without
technique is a mess.”265
Solving this “mess” will require the Court to exercise two judicial
262. The instruction requested by the defendant in Williams is not a good model because the
requested charge did not indicate that the jury should consider harm to others in determining
reprehensibility. Instead, the requested charge would instruct the jury as follows: “‘The size of any
punishment should bear a reasonable relationship to the harm caused to Jesse Williams . . . . [Y]ou
may consider the extent of harm suffered by others in determining what that reasonable relationship
is . . . .’” Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1068 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(quoting Joint Appendix, Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (No. 05-1256), 2006 WL 2147483, at *280).
263. See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 101–11 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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virtues: technique and restraint. For punitive damages doctrine, technique
would involve a greater concern for craft, including a shift from reliance
on ad hoc decision-making to a greater emphasis on coherent decisions,
particularly concerning theoretical issues such as the role of punitive
damages in deterring corporate misconduct. Judicial restraint would
require replacing the current “bashing” of state courts with the respect they
deserve. This shift would be similar to the shift in takings law from
“bashing” regulators to showing them respect.266
This emphasis on technique and restraint would involve a change, not
an abandonment, of the Court’s role. Instead of the ad hoc micromanaging
involved in cases like Gore, Campbell, and Williams, the Court would
focus on the theoretical foundation underlying its limits on the imposition
of punitive damages awards. If, for example, the Court wants to eliminate
or severely limit some particular factor—deterrence, for example—when
determining the amount of punitive damages, it must present a very strong
theoretical justification for denying the states’ right to choose deterrence
as a goal and must articulate a clear statement of the new requirement. On
the other hand, if the Court cannot articulate a coherent reason for
eliminating or limiting the role of deterrence, it should restrain from
prohibiting the use of or ignoring the role of deterrence in determining the
amount of punitive damages. At the same time, however, it could insist
that, as a matter of procedural due process, any state court using deterrence
to determine that an award is not excessive must be clear about the role
deterrence plays in its decision. But what if a state court gives clear
266. Regulators were initially granted respect and deference in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. City of New York, which adopted a balancing test for identifying an unconstitutional taking.
438 U.S. 104, 105 (1978). However, in the 1990s a different approach emerged. For example,
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, which adopted a per se rule that a regulation effecting
a total loss of all value in real property is a taking, adopts a style that can be viewed as “bashing”
state court and state legislatures. 505 U.S. 1003, 1017–19 (1992). For example, Justice Scalia’s
majority opinion asserted that government has a natural tendency to use the police power to
eliminate private property and engage in “plundering” and that the harm principle would not be an
effective limit unless the legislature had a “stupid staff.” Id. at 1025 n.12. His opinion in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission referred to regulatory conditions imposed on coastal development
as “‘an out-and-out plan of extortion.’” 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v.
Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14–15 (N.H. 1981)). In contrast, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc.
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, which upheld a moratorium on development to provide an
opportunity to plan, is far more respectful. 535 U.S. 302, 306 (2002). For example, the TahoeSierra opinion stressed the environmental importance of the water quality of Lake Tahoe, the need
for a comprehensive regional plan to protect the lake, and that delays in adopting a plan resulted
“[d]espite the fact that TRPA performed [its] obligations in ‘good faith and to the best of its
ability.’” Id. at 307–11 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency,
34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1233 (D. Nev. 1999), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000),
aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)). The opinion further noted that moratoria are “an essential tool of
successful development” because they enable a planning agency to “make well-reasoned
decisions.” Id. at 337–40.
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reasons, presented coherently in terms of permissible factors, for an award
that is so large the Court feels the need to reverse it? In such a case, the
virtue of restraint would require the Court to accept the lower court’s
decision. If the amount is nevertheless so outrageous that reversal is
required, then morals would justify a reversal, while the virtue of
technique would require a clear articulation of the basis for the decision.
In this way, the Court can achieve both morals and technique.
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